# Asymptotic Learning with Ambiguous Information* 

Pëllumb Reshidi ${ }^{\dagger}$ João Thereze ${ }^{\ddagger} \quad$ Mu Zhang ${ }^{\text {§ }}$

June 2023


#### Abstract

We study asymptotic learning when the decision maker is ambiguous about the precision of her information sources. She aims to estimate a state and evaluates outcomes according to the worst-case scenario. Under prior-by-prior updating, ambiguity regarding information sources induces ambiguity about the state. We show this induced ambiguity does not vanish even as the number of information sources grows indefinitely. We characterize the limit set of posteriors and find that the decision maker's asymptotic estimate of the state is generically incorrect. We show that even a small amount of ambiguity may lead to large estimation errors. Among other applications, we analyze a setting in which the decision maker learns from observing others' actions.


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## 1 Introduction

Consider agents who rely on multiple information sources to learn about a payoff-relevant state. A voter turns to poll results and advertising to gauge a politician's competence and agenda, while an investor leverages the reports of various analysts to project the future returns of a stock. A common assumption in the literature is that the decision maker has beliefs about the quality of her information sources and that these beliefs are correctly specified. In such cases, asymptotic learning is successful. While these assumptions seem reasonable, forming beliefs may often not be straightforward. For example, consider a prospective customer consulting online reviews before making a purchase decision. She may not have particular beliefs about the quality of reviewers because they are being consulted for the first time. Despite the prevalence of such settings, little is known about learning in these environments. This paper addresses the gap.

We analyze asymptotic learning when the decision maker lacks particular beliefs about her information sources. We study a decision maker who estimates a state by minimizing a loss function. She observes functions of multiple unbiased signals. The state and the signals are jointly normally distributed, but the decision maker does not know the signals' precisions - that is, the inverse of their variances. The decision maker is not probabilistically sophisticated; instead, she is ambiguous regarding the precision of each information source and perceives them to lie in a bounded interval. Each assignment of precisions to information sources pins down a belief of the decision maker, a joint distribution over signals and the state. Thus, an interval of perceived precisions induces a set of beliefs. We assume the decision maker updates her beliefs prior by prior. Concretely, upon observing information, she updates each belief in her belief set according to Bayes' rule. In doing so, the agent obtains multiple posterior distributions for the state. Thus, ambiguity about precisions induces ambiguity about the state. Finally, she takes a robust approach and evaluates the expected loss according to the worst case across all posteriors.

This setup encompasses a broad range of environments. By modeling
observables as functions of signals, we account for various scenarios, such as the decision maker directly observing unbiased signals, or monitoring the actions of other agents. Moreover, our main insights go through beyond certain assumptions mentioned in the previous paragraph. ${ }^{1}$ To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to show how ambiguity aversion disrupts classical inference from large samples.

Our first result shows the induced ambiguity concerning the state does not vanish asymptotically. That is, the posterior beliefs of the decision maker do not converge to a single distribution as the number of information sources grows. We characterize this asymptotic set of posteriors. As in standard Bayesian learning, the variance of each posterior converges to zero. However, different beliefs about precisions lead to different weighting of signals and, consequently, to different posterior means. For example, for any realization of signals, the agent's belief set contains a belief that assigns higher precisions to signals with high realizations and lower precisions otherwise. In this case, the posterior mean converges to a relatively high value. Similarly, there exist beliefs that lead to a relatively low posterior mean. Considering the set of all beliefs generates an interval of posterior means. The set of asymptotic posteriors is the set of Dirac measures over values in that interval. Importantly, this set is independent of the objective of the decision maker.

Our second result characterizes the decision maker's asymptotic estimate of the state. Her decision problem can be interpreted as a zero-sum game against nature. Initially, the decision maker receives information and chooses the estimate that minimizes her expected loss. Subsequently, nature chooses the precision of each source in a manner that maximizes the decision maker's loss. In doing so, nature affects the agent's posterior distribution. We show that, asymptotically, this is equivalent to nature choosing posterior means in the interval described in the previous paragraph. If the agent chooses a relatively low value within the interval, nature will maximize her loss by choosing the highest value possible, and vice versa.

[^1]To minimize the maximal loss, the agent chooses an estimate that renders nature indifferent between choosing the highest or lowest value from the interval of posterior means.

We show that, in our setting, asymptotic learning typically fails. That is, the agent's estimate is not consistent. Thus, we complement the vast literature on model misspecification, which obtains similar results by assuming the true parameter values are not in the support of the decision maker's prior distribution. By contrast, we maintain the assumption that the true precisions are in the set of beliefs the agent deems possible. Surprisingly, we show the agent's estimate is typically inconsistent even in cases in which a misspecified Bayesian decision maker would learn the truth.

These results have several implications. First, we show that initial conditions exist in which even a small amount of ambiguity can lead to arbitrarily large losses and estimation errors. These situations arise when the initial set of possible signal precisions is relatively low. Therefore, the magnitude of ambiguity and estimation error need not be proportional; a minor degree of ambiguity can have a major impact in the quality of asymptotic learning.

Second, we show the decision maker can be worse off even if she perceives all of her information sources as more informative. Consider two decision problems, $a$ and $b$, in which the agent directly observes unbiased signals but has different intervals of perceived precision. We show that even if the lowest precision in $a$ is higher than the highest precision in $b$, the decision maker may be better off under $b$. To carry out this comparison, we study how the initial ambiguity about precisions maps into induced ambiguity about the state. In particular, we show that the interval of posterior means is determined by the ratio between the highest and lowest possible perceived precisions. Because the length of this interval pins down the agent's loss, her welfare is monotonic in this ratio, regardless of the level of perceived precisions.

Lastly, we explore an application in which the decision maker learns from the actions of others instead of directly observing signals. In this context, an ambiguity averse econometrician observes choices made by Bayesian
decision makers who attempt to estimate a payoff-relevant state given their private information. She aims to estimate this state but does not know the precision of their private signals. For a concrete example, consider a healthcare official assessing the prevalence of a disease in a region. She relies on hospital reports to do so but is not sure about the quality of their data collection protocols. We show the econometrician generically fails to aggregate information. We characterize how she may over- or underreact to the information contained in the observed actions as a function of her prior beliefs and the true level of precisions.

Related Literature Our paper follows the literature on learning under ambiguity. Epstein and Schneider (2007) introduce a framework where an agent seeking to learn the state of the world lacks confidence in their information about the environment. They consider the maxmin expected utility model (MEU) following Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and a general updating rule for ambiguity that encompasses both prior-by-prior (full Bayesian) updating (Pires, 2002) and maximum likelihood updating (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1993). Epstein and Schneider (2008) study an application to a financial market where the representative agent observes one signal with ambiguous precision and updates her beliefs prior by prior. They show how this ambiguity affects reactions to information and the asset price. Followup papers extend these results by incorporating ambiguity about the mean of the signals and by considering equilibrium portfolio choices as well as general utility functions (Illeditsch, 2011; Gollier, 2011; Condie and Ganguli, 2017). In this paper, we consider a similar setup as Epstein and Schneider (2008) but focus on whether ambiguity vanishes and whether the agent can estimate the state correctly when the number of signals she observes goes to infinity. ${ }^{2}$

Of relevance is also the literature on single-agent misspecified learn-

[^2]ing, which is another possible driving force for the failure of asymptotic learning. In this literature, a misspecified agent typically has a prior that assigns probability 0 to (a neighborhood of) the true model. Berk (1966) and Shalizi (2009) show that with exogenous information, under mild conditions, the agent's beliefs converge, although not to the true state. Other works focused on settings where the signals can be affected by the actions of the agent and are hence endogenous. Nyarko (1991) and Fudenberg et al. (2017) provide examples in which the convergence of beliefs fails. Similar to our setup, Heidhues et al. (2019) considers the convergence of beliefs and actions with a Gaussian prior and signals. Frick et al. (2020b), Esponda et al. (2019), and Fudenberg et al. (2020) focus on the convergence results in general models with finite actions. Our paper differs from the existing work in three ways. First, the agent in the misspecified learning literature is a Bayesian learner, whereas, in our setup, the decision maker holds multiple beliefs and adopts prior-by-prior updating. Second, the decision maker in our model is not misspecified in the sense that the true model is contained in her set of priors. Third, we show that in our setting, even when information is exogenous, as in Berk (1966) and Shalizi (2009), the belief set diverges almost surely.

Our paper also relates to the robust statistics literature (Huber, 2004). Roughly speaking, robust statistics are statistics that produce good performance even with deviations from assumptions on the data generation process. Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2013) highlight the close relation between decision-making under ambiguity, akin to the approach in this paper, and robust statistics, and characterize conditions under which the two approaches are equivalent. However, the problems studied in the robust statistics literature typically differ from the ones studied in this paper. For instance, Giacomini and Kitagawa (2020) and Giacomini et al. (2019) propose new tools for Bayesian inference in set-identified models to reconcile the asymptotic disagreement between Bayesian and frequentist inferences. ${ }^{3}$ By con-

[^3]trast, our focus is on whether information aggregation is successful as the number of sources grows without bounds. Even in cases of point-identified models, ambiguity does not vanish in our setup because the precisions of different information sources are allowed to be different. Finally, this result is in contrast to Marinacci (2002), where ambiguity vanishes because all observations are drawn from the same ambiguous distribution.

## 2 Setup

A decision maker aims to learn the state of the world, $\theta \in \Theta:=\mathbb{R}$, and has access to $N$ information sources, $I=:\{1, \ldots, N\}$. It is common knowledge that the state $\theta$ is normally distributed, $\mathcal{N}\left(\mu, \frac{1}{\rho_{\mu}}\right)$. We call $\rho_{\mu}>0$ the precision of the prior. Each information source $i \in I$ produces a signal $s_{i}=\theta+\varepsilon_{i}$, where the noise $\varepsilon_{i}$ is normally distributed with mean 0 and precision $\rho_{i}>0$, that is, $\varepsilon_{i} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \frac{1}{\rho_{i}}\right) .{ }^{4}$ We assume that the state and all noises are independent of each other given precisions.

The actual precisions of the information sources are drawn i.i.d. from some distribution function $G$ on $[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]$ with $\bar{\rho}>\underline{\rho}>0$. The decision maker in our model is ambiguous about the precisions of her information sources. In particular, she knows that the precision of each information source lies in $[\rho, \bar{\rho}]$, but she cannot form a probabilistic belief about it. Rather, the decision maker forms conjectures about the precision of any information source $i$. We denote the decision maker's conjectured precision as $\hat{\rho}_{i} \in[\rho, \bar{\rho}]$. Note that the decision maker is not misspecified because she does not deem the actual precisions as impossible ex-ante. This observation follows from the assumption that the actual precision $\rho_{i}$ of information source $i$ lies in the perceived precision set $[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]$. The assumption that actual precisions are i.i.d. is not fundamental. Rather, it provides a sensible benchmark by making the asymptotic empirical distribution of signals deterministic.

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${ }^{4}$ Our framework is suitable for analyzing biased signals as well. However, in that setup, issues of identifiability arise, which are not the focus of this paper. When these issues do not arise, our main insights remain unchanged.

The decision maker doesn't necessarily observe the realized signals directly. The observable for each information source $i$ is a function $\boldsymbol{a}$, which maps the realized signal, $s_{i}$, and the precision of information source $i$ to a number $\boldsymbol{a}\left(s_{i}, \rho_{i}\right)$ observed by the decision maker. We assume that for each precision $\rho_{i}$, the observable $\boldsymbol{a}\left(s_{i}, \rho_{i}\right)$ is invertible as a function of $s_{i}$. Denote the realized observable as $a_{i}$ and the inverted function for signals as $s^{a}\left(a_{i}, \rho_{i}\right)$. Given the observable $a_{i}$ and the conjectured precision $\hat{\rho}_{i}$, the decision maker's conjectured signal is $\hat{s}_{i}=s^{a}\left(a_{i}, \hat{\rho}_{i}\right)$, which might be different from the actual realized signal $s_{i}$. Moreover, conditional on the realized state $\theta$, the actual observables are i.i.d. according to the distribution function $F$ on $\mathbb{R}$ where

$$
F(a)=\int_{[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]} F_{\rho}\left(s^{a}(a, \rho)\right) d G(\rho),
$$

with $F_{\rho} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\theta, \frac{1}{\rho}\right)$ for each $\rho \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]$. Later in this paper, we will discuss several different observables. Among them, the unbiased signal sources might be directly observable - $\boldsymbol{a}\left(s_{i}, \rho_{i}\right)=s_{i}$. We also study the case in which the decision maker can observe estimates of Bayesian agents based on their common prior and private signals - $\boldsymbol{a}\left(s_{i}, \rho_{i}\right)=\frac{\rho_{i} s_{i}+\rho_{\mu} \mu}{\rho_{i}+\rho_{\mu}}$.

Belief Updating Denote the profile of precisions as $\rho^{N}:=\left(\rho_{1}, \ldots, \rho_{N}\right)$, the profile of conjectured precisions as $\hat{\rho}^{N}:=\left(\hat{\rho}_{1}, \ldots, \hat{\rho}_{N}\right)$, and the profile of observables as $a^{N}:=\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{N}\right)$, and, for each $n \geq 1$, the set of distributions over $\mathbb{R}^{n}$ as $\Delta\left(\mathbb{R}^{n}\right)$. Following Epstein and Schneider (2007) and Epstein and Schneider (2008), we define $L^{a}\left(\hat{\rho}^{N}, \theta\right) \in \Delta\left(\mathbb{R}^{n}\right)$ as the likelihood function for the profile of observables, which is the conditional distribution for observables given conjectured precisions $\hat{\rho}^{N}$ and the realized state $\theta$. Then the set of likelihood functions of the decision maker can be represented by $\mathcal{L}_{N}^{a}$, where

$$
\mathcal{L}_{N}^{a}=\left\{L^{a}\left(\hat{\rho}^{N}, \theta\right) \in \Delta\left(\mathbb{R}^{N}\right): \hat{\rho}^{N} \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]^{N}, \theta \in \mathbb{R}\right\} .
$$

Note that to calculate the likelihood function of observables, one can first calculate the likelihood function of signals, which is just a multivariate
normal distribution with independent marginals, and then make use of the one-to-one mapping between signals and observables given the profile of conjectured precisions.

We assume the decision maker adopts full Bayesian updating (Pires, 2002) to derive posteriors using the prior and the set of likelihood functions $\mathcal{L}_{N}^{a}$. In other words, given the realized profile of observables $a^{N}$, and a vector of conjectured precisions $\hat{\rho}^{N}$, the posterior over the state $P_{N}^{a}\left(a^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right) \in$ $\Delta(\mathbb{R})$ is obtained by applying Bayes' rule. ${ }^{5}$ Then, the posteriors of the decision maker can be represented by the following set:

$$
\mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)=\left\{P_{N}^{a}\left(a^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right) \in \Delta(\mathbb{R}): \hat{\rho}^{N} \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]^{N}\right\} .
$$

After seeing the profile of observables, the decision maker chooses an estimate $g$ of the state $\theta$ to minimize a loss function $u(g-\theta)$. We assume $u: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is strictly convex and minimized at 0 . Given multiple beliefs, the decision maker is a maxmin expected utility (MEU) maximizer following Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and she evaluates her estimate based on the worst possible belief. This preference might be a result of the decision maker being ambiguity averse or the decision maker's intention to derive a robust upper bound for the expected loss. That is, the decision maker's objective is to minimize the maximal expected loss across all distributions in the set of posteriors. She picks an estimate $g$ to solve the following min-max problem:

$$
\min _{g} \max _{p \in \mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)}\left\{\mathbb{E}_{p}[u(g-\theta)]\right\}
$$

To maintain tractability, we made several assumptions. In Section 6, we discuss how our results depend on these assumptions. We highlight that our belief-updating rule is the crucial assumption needed for our results.

In the rest of the paper, we focus on the limiting case in which the num-

[^4]ber of information sources $N$ goes to infinity. ${ }^{6}$

## 3 Asymptotic Beliefs

In this section, we characterize how the agent's posterior set behaves as the number of observables grows large. In particular, recall that for any $N$, the decision maker observes $a^{N}$. Given a profile of conjectured precisions $\hat{\rho}^{N}$, the decision maker's posterior belief is $P_{N}^{\mathbf{a}}\left(a^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right)$. We are interested in the asymptotic behavior of the agent's posterior set: $\mathbb{P}^{\mathbf{a}}\left(a^{N}\right)$. Thus, we define the limit set of posteriors:

$$
\mathbb{P}_{\infty}^{\mathbf{a}}(a)=\left\{P: \exists \hat{\rho} \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]^{\infty} \text { s.t. } P=\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty} P^{\mathbf{a}}\left(a^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right)\right\}
$$

Note $\mathbb{P}_{\infty}^{\mathbf{a}}(a)$ is defined as the set of limits of posteriors that can be generated by some profile of precisions. That definition is silent about which posterior beliefs converge. In fact, many non-converging sequences of posterior beliefs exist, but, as Section 4 will make clearer, these sequences are immaterial for our discussion.

To characterize this set, we start by interpreting the optimization problem described in Section 2 as a zero-sum game between the decision maker and nature. Under this interpretation, after signals are realized, the decision maker chooses an estimate for the state to minimize her loss function. Subsequently, with knowledge of the estimate, nature is free to choose, for each signal, any precision within the uncertainty set of the decision maker. The decision maker's objective is then to guarantee the lowest loss conditional on the fact that nature acts after her and to her detriment.

### 3.1 Quadratic Loss with Observable Signals

To help build intuition and as a rough sketch of the proof of our more general results, we describe and partially analyze the special case in which the loss function is quadratic, and the realized signals are observable; that is,

[^5]$u(g-\theta)=(g-\theta)^{2}$ and $\boldsymbol{a}\left(s_{i}, \rho_{i}\right)=s_{i}$. In other words, the decision maker has access to $N$ unbiased and normally distributed signals $s_{i}=\theta+\varepsilon_{i}$, with $\varepsilon_{i} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \frac{1}{\rho_{i}}\right)$. Recall the true $\rho_{i}$ are unknown to the decision maker, who entertains an interval of perceived precision $[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]$. The decision maker's objective is to minimize the maximal mean-squared errors across all distributions in the set of posteriors. We denote by $s^{N}$ the vector of the $N$ observed signals. She picks an estimate $g$ to solve the following problem:
$$
\min _{g} \max _{p \in \mathbb{P}^{s}\left(s^{N}\right)}\left\{\mathbb{E}_{p}\left[(g-\theta)^{2}\right]\right\} .
$$

Due to the properties of the quadratic loss function, the above optimization problem can be simplified to one that only depends on the conditional mean and variance of the state, which can be calculated in closed form due to the assumption of joint normality. Denote them as $\mathbb{E}\left[\theta \mid s^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right]=\frac{\hat{\rho}^{N} \cdot s^{N}+\rho_{\mu} \mu}{\hat{\rho}^{N} \cdot \mathbb{1}^{N}+\rho_{\mu}}$ and $\mathbb{V}\left[\theta \mid s^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right]=\left(1-\frac{\hat{\rho}^{N} \cdot \mathbb{1}^{N}}{\hat{\rho}^{N} \cdot \mathbb{1}^{N}+\rho_{\mu}}\right) \frac{1}{\rho_{\mu}}$ respectively. Then, the objective of the decision maker becomes

$$
\min _{g} \max _{\hat{\rho} \in[\underline{\rho}, \overline{\bar{j}}}{ }^{N}\left\{\left(g-\mathbb{E}\left[\theta \mid s^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right]\right)^{2}+\mathbb{V}\left[\theta \mid s^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right]\right\} .
$$

By changing the precision of each signal, nature affects both the squared bias and the variance. It determines variance by choosing the sum of precisions across signals, and, importantly, it affects the posterior mean by assigning different precisions to different signal realizations. From the definition of the posterior variance, we see that as long as each signal is somewhat informative ( $\rho>0$ ), as the number of available signals $N$ increases, the posterior variance converges to 0 . Hence, the more signals the decision maker receives, the more nature focuses on affecting the decision maker's loss function via the squared bias. In the extreme case, in which $N \rightarrow \infty$, for any choice of precisions that nature may consider, the posterior variance is equal to 0 , and nature utilizes the square bias as its only lever. We next characterize nature's behavior when $N \rightarrow \infty$, where nature's choice of what
precision to attribute to which signal exclusively affects the posterior mean.
Definition 1. An assignment $\hat{\rho}: \mathbb{R}^{\infty} \rightarrow[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]^{\infty}$ is order-preserving if $s_{i} \leq s_{j} \Longrightarrow$ $\hat{\rho}_{i} \leq \hat{\rho}_{j}$ for all $i, j \in \mathbb{N}$; and it is order-reversing if $s_{i} \leq s_{j} \Longrightarrow \hat{\rho}_{i} \geq \hat{\rho}_{j}$, for all $i, j \in \mathbb{N}$. An assignment is a threshold assignment if it is order-preserving or order-reversing and $\operatorname{Im}(\hat{\rho}) \in\{\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}\}^{\infty}$

Lemma 1. Let $\hat{\rho}^{*}$ solve $\max _{\hat{\rho} \in[\rho, \bar{\rho}]^{\infty}}(g-\mathbb{E}[\theta \mid s, \hat{\rho}])^{2}$ for some $g \in \mathbb{R}$. Under observable signals, $\hat{\rho}^{*}$ is a threshold assignment.

Nature finds it optimal to assign precisions to signals to maximize the squared bias. Intuitively, the way to do so is to either maximize or minimize the posterior mean: if the decision maker's estimate $g$ is relatively low, nature finds it optimal to maximize the posterior mean, and vice versa. The intuition for Lemma 1 can be derived by analyzing the expression of the posterior mean when $N$ goes to infinity. In that case, given an observed empirical distribution of signals, $F$, the expression for the posterior mean can be written as: $\mathbb{E}[\theta \mid s, \hat{\rho}]=\frac{\int s \hat{\rho}(s) d F(s)}{\int \hat{\rho}(s) d F(s)}$. Consider nature's choice to maximize this expression while keeping the same expected value of conjectured precisions $\int \hat{\rho}(s) d F(s)=c \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]$. Because $c$ pins down the denominator of the expression for the posterior mean, nature chooses an assignment to maximize $\int s \hat{\rho}(s) d F(s)$. To do so, nature assigns high-valued signals high precisions and low-valued signals low precisions, thereby moving the posterior mean towards higher signal realizations. Using the extreme precisions $\bar{\rho}$ and $\underline{\rho}$ is the best way to achieve this, therefore justifying the optimality of threshold strategies. Naturally, an analogous strategy is optimal to minimize the posterior mean.

To summarize this example, as the number of signals goes to infinity, nature focuses on affecting the agent's bias by strategically assigning precisions to signal realizations. Asymptotically, this is the only way nature can affect the agent's loss, as variance goes to zero regardless of the decision maker's conjecture. Finally, nature can implement this bias-maximizing behavior by applying threshold strategies: monotonic precision assignments that use only extreme precisions.

### 3.2 Ambiguity Does Not Vanish

When signals are observable, and the loss function is quadratic, we argued in the previous section that (i) nature can restrict attention to threshold strategies, and (ii) as the number of signals goes to infinity, the set of posteriors converges to a set of degenerate distributions. We now show these two insights generalize.

First, we provide sufficient conditions on observables that guarantee nature can still restrict attention to threshold strategies. Recall that under general observables, the agent cannot observe the realized signal but rather has to backtrack those signals based on their conjectured precision. In particular, given conjectures precision $\hat{\rho}_{i}$ and observable realization $a_{i}$, the agent believes the signal realization is $\hat{s}_{i}=\mathbf{s}^{\mathbf{a}}\left(\hat{\rho}_{i}, a_{i}\right)$. In contrast to the case of observable signals, when associating a particular precision with an observable realization, the agent changes his interpretation of the signal realization. The following assumption ensures the effect of this association does not break the monotonicity between observables and inverted signals that is required for simple threshold strategies to be optimal.

Assumption 1. Define the weighted inverted signal function $w(\rho, x) \equiv \rho \mathbf{s}^{\mathbf{a}}(\rho, x)$ and assume that $w$ is affine in $\rho$ and strictly supermodular.

This assumption allows for a broad range of observables relevant to several economic applications. The two examples described in the setup - directly observable unbiased signals and observable estimates from Bayesian agents with private information - satisfy this assumption. In the context of financial markets, the demand of CARA investors for an asset with value $\theta$ also satisfies Assumption 1. In particular, when the unbiased signals are the investor's private information, their demand for the risky asset is $\boldsymbol{a}\left(s_{i}, \rho_{i}\right)=\frac{1}{\alpha}\left(\rho_{i} s_{i}+\rho_{\mu} \mu\right)$, where $\alpha$ is their absolute risk aversion. The following result generalizes Lemma 1.

Lemma 2. Let $\hat{\rho}^{*}$ solve $\max _{\hat{\rho} \in[\rho, \bar{\rho}]^{\infty}} u(g-\mathbb{E}[\theta \mid a, \hat{\rho}])$ for some $g \in \mathbb{R}$. Under Assumption 1, $\hat{\rho}^{*}$ is a threshold assignment.

We now address the asymptotic behavior of posteriors. As previously discussed, each strategy of nature corresponds to a plausible belief in the agent's belief set. In the previous section, as the number of observables went to infinity, we argued that nature loses the ability to influence the posterior variance as aggregate information becomes infinitely precise. However, by assigning precisions to signals, nature could still affect the agent's bias. With general loss functions, higher moments of the posterior distribution are payoff-relevant for the agent. Nevertheless, the above rationale is preserved: all moments but the posterior mean become irrelevant asymptotically, and, in the limit, nature can only command the interval of posterior means. As a consequence, the set of posterior beliefs converges to an interval of degenerate distributions regardless of the loss function. Recall that $F$ is the actual distribution over observables given $\theta$.

Theorem 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Define:
$\bar{m}=\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}} s^{a}(x, \underline{\rho}) d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{\bar{m}}^{\infty} s^{a}(x, \bar{\rho}) d F(x)}{\underline{\rho} F(\bar{m})+\bar{\rho}(1-F(\bar{m}))}, \underline{m}=\frac{\bar{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\underline{m}} s^{a}(x, \bar{\rho}) d F(x)+\underline{\rho} \int_{\underline{m}}^{\infty} s^{a}(x, \underline{\rho}) d F(x)}{\bar{\rho} F(\underline{m})+\underline{\rho}(1-F(\underline{m}))}$.
Then, for almost all sequences, $a$, of realized observables,

1. For all sequences $\hat{\rho} \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]^{\infty}$,

$$
\underline{m} \leq \lim _{N \rightarrow \infty} \inf \mathbb{E}_{P_{N}\left(a^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right)}\left[\theta \mid a^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right] \leq \lim _{N \rightarrow \infty} \sup \mathbb{E}_{P_{N}\left(a^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right)}\left[\theta \mid a^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right] \leq \bar{m} .
$$

2. The limit set of posteriors is a set of degenerate distributions independent of $s$ :

$$
\mathbb{P}_{\infty}(s)=\left\{\delta_{b}: \underline{m} \leq b \leq \bar{m}\right\} .
$$

Theorem 1 formalizes the observation above. It starts by establishing that for any precision assignment, posterior means are bounded by two real numbers: $\underline{m}, \bar{m}$. These numbers formalize the notion of maximal and minimal posterior means that nature can achieve asymptotically. The second part of the theorem shows that any converging posterior approximates a
degenerate distribution and that distribution may have any mean between the boundaries $\underline{m}$ and $\bar{m}$. Finally, Theorem 1 characterizes the values of these boundaries. For example, $\bar{m}$ is generated by the following strategy of nature: give the highest precision to signals higher than $\bar{m}$ and the lowest precision to values below it. By giving more weight to high signals, nature moves the posterior mean up. The highest such posterior mean is expressed by the fixed point $\bar{m}$.

For an intuition on the formula for $\bar{m}$, suppose we start with a threshold $m$ that is lower than such expected value. Then, increasing the threshold to $m^{\prime}>m$ has two effects. First, by assigning all values in ( $m, m^{\prime}$ ) to low precisions, the precision-weighted sum of signals is reduced. When $m^{\prime}$ is close to $m$, this effect is roughly proportional to the marginal signal, $m$. Second, the precision-weighted mass of signals is reduced with more signals at low precision. This effectively increases the value of all the inframarginal signals, so it is proportional to the precision-weighted average signal. Because the expected value was higher than the threshold to begin with, the second effect dominates the first, and the expected value of signals increases. This process can be repeated until the marginal signal equals the average. ${ }^{7}$

The fundamental consequence of Theorem 1 is that induced ambiguity about the state does not vanish asymptotically. Rather, the agent still entertains a wide range of values for the state $\theta$ even when he has access to an arbitrarily large number of informative observables. This finding is in stark contrast to quantifiable risk. In fact, a secondary consequence of the result above is that quantifiable risk completely disappears even in our setting: all the limit posteriors are degenerate around their means. In the next section, we show how the presence of ambiguity in the limit set of posteriors affects the optimal estimate of the agent.

[^6]
## 4 Asymptotic Estimate

In this section, we characterize the asymptotic behavior of the decision maker. In particular, we are interested in analyzing how ambiguity with regard to the decision maker's information sources affects her ability to correctly estimate the state as the number of observables increases. Recall that, for each realization of observables $a^{N}$, her estimate $g^{*}\left(a^{N}\right)$ minimizes her loss function, considering the worst-case posterior in $\mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)$. Because observables and loss functions are arbitrary, obtaining an explicit solution to $g^{*}\left(a^{N}\right)$ for finite $N$ is not an easy task, which makes a direct attempt at characterizing the solution intractable. To solve this problem, we leverage on Theorem 1. The main result of this section characterizes the asymptotic estimate by showing the following limit exchange holds.

$$
\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty} \arg \min _{g} \max _{p \in \mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)} \mathbb{E}_{p}[u(g-\theta)]=\arg \min _{g} \max _{p \in \mathbb{P}_{\infty}(a)} \mathbb{E}_{p}[u(g-\theta)] .
$$

Theorem 1 states that $\mathbb{P}_{\infty}(a)=\left\{\delta_{m}: m \in[\underline{m}, \bar{m}]\right\}$ for almost all realizations of observables. The limit swap above suggests that, as $N$ grows, the optimal estimate converges to the estimate of an agent who does not know the mean of $\theta$ but wants to guarantee the minimal loss in the interval $[\underline{m}, \bar{m}]$. This observation greatly simplifies the characterization: the asymptotic behavior of the estimate is pinned down by an extremely simple optimization problem. In this problem, the agent only cares about how biased her estimate is in the worst-case scenario. Recall that her loss is larger the further from the true state her estimate is. If her estimate is too far from $\underline{m}$, she has a large utility loss in the worst case, in which the state is actually $\underline{m}$. A symmetric argument holds for $\bar{m}$. Therefore, she guarantees minimal loss by being indifferent between these two extreme possible values of the state. This intuition is formalized in the next result.

Theorem 2. $g^{*}\left(s^{N}\right) \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} g^{*}$, where $g^{*}$ is the unique solution to $u\left(g^{*}-\underline{m}\right)=u\left(g^{*}-\right.$ $\bar{m})$.

Although intuitive, this result depends on the non-trivial exchange of
limits mentioned above. A priori, it is not clear that the limit swap holds. First, the limits of optimizers of a sequence of optimization problems are not guaranteed to coincide with the optimizers of the limit problem. Second, not all distributions in the set $\mathbb{P}^{\boldsymbol{a}}\left(a^{N}\right)$ converge. Indeed, sequences of precisions always exist such that posterior beliefs diverge. Still, our result confirms the limit exchange is valid, and the heuristic argument we gave above goes through formally. We make this argument in two steps, addressing each of the concerns highlighted above.

The first step is to show the decision maker's optimization can be approximated by an optimization that considers only the mean of posterior distributions as $N$ grows large. For any finite $N$, the decision maker's loss is clearly affected by higher moments of the posteriors, but because quantifiable risk vanishes as the number of observable information sources grows, the mean progressively becomes the only relevant moment. The second step relies on an extension of the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem. It provides the important result that the sequence $g^{*}\left(a^{N}\right)$ is bounded. Recall, from part 1 of Theorem 1, that non-converging posteriors are bounded. Thus, intuitively, $N$ by $N$, the payoff obtained by a non-converging sequence can be bounded by the payoff of two converging sequences so that restricting attention to the converging ones turns out to be without loss of generality. As a consequence, non-converging beliefs are innocuous: we can characterize the asymptotic behavior of the agent's estimate without addressing them. We prove these two steps are sufficient to guarantee the convergence of $g^{*}$.

Theorem 2 shows the asymptotic estimate is typically incorrect. To illustrate, recall that $[\underline{m}, \bar{m}]$ in Theorem 1 are independent of the particular choice of the loss function. Rather, they are determined by the initial ambiguity and the observable function $\boldsymbol{a}$. By contrast, the asymptotic estimate is a consequence of the behavior of the loss function, $u$, on the interval of posterior means $[\underline{m}, \bar{m}]$. This finding suggests the decision maker estimates the state correctly asymptotically only in the knife-edge case in which her loss function coincides with the observable function in a particular way. Moreover, in that case, perturbing either of these functions would again
lead to an incorrect limit estimate. This result is particularly striking when compared to the behavior of a Bayesian agent who knows the precision of each source. ${ }^{8}$ Because observables map one-to-one to signals conditional on precisions, a Bayesian's asymptotic estimate would be equal to the state, regardless of the loss function.

### 4.1 Observable signals: Loss Symmetry

We now focus on the case in which signals are directly observable - $\boldsymbol{a}\left(s_{i}, \rho_{i}\right)-$ $s_{i}$. A loss function is symmetric if $u(x)=u(-x)$ for any real number $x$. We show that when signals are observable, the symmetry of the loss function plays a prominent role in the asymptotic estimate. Indeed, by Theorem 2, we have that, under symmetric losses, $g^{*}=\frac{\bar{m}+\underline{m}}{2}$. Because signals are observable, Theorem 1 states that $\underline{m}$ and $\bar{m}$ are defined by:

$$
\bar{m}=\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}} x d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{\bar{m}}^{\infty} x d F(x)}{\underline{\rho} F(\bar{m})+\bar{\rho}(1-F(\bar{m}))}, \quad \underline{m}=\frac{\bar{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\underline{m}} x d F(x)+\underline{\rho} \int_{\underline{m}}^{\infty} x d F(x)}{\bar{\rho} F(\underline{m})+\underline{\rho}(1-F(\underline{m}))} .
$$

Normality implies the real distribution of signals $F$ is symmetric around the true state $\theta$. Thus, in this case, the decision maker estimates the state correctly. The next result formalizes this relationship between symmetry of the loss function and consistency of the estimate, and proves a partial converse.

Corollary 1. Fix a state $\theta$. If $u$ is symmetric and signals are observable, $g^{*}\left(s^{N}\right) \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }}$ $\theta$ for any perceived precision set $[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]$. If $u$ is not symmetric, then there exist perceived precision sets $[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]$ and a number $g^{*}$ such that $g^{*}\left(s^{N}\right) \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} g^{*} \neq \theta$.

This result highlights that the consistency of the decision maker's estimate depends on the symmetry of the loss function, as well as the symmetry of the normal distribution, even under observable signals.

[^7]Example: Asymmetric Quadratic Loss Let the loss function be given by:

$$
u(g-\theta)= \begin{cases}(g-\theta)^{2} & \text { if } g \geq \theta \\ \lambda(g-\theta)^{2} & \text { if } g<\theta\end{cases}
$$

with $\lambda>0$. That is, the decision maker's may evaluate losses differently depending on whether the state $\theta$ is over- or under- estimated. If $\lambda>1$, for example, the agent is less concerned with losses when she overestimates the true state, compared to when she underestimates it. Her concern could be lower for many reasons. For instance, a health official who wants to learn about the prevalence of a disease in a population would likely lose more by believing the transmission rate is lower than it really is than believing it is higher. Conversely, a product developer may face a much harsher personal loss if they believe demand is higher than it actually is and end up developing a costly product that fails to be marketed.

Following Theorem 2, we have that the optimal estimate satisfies $g^{*}=$ $\frac{m+\sqrt{\lambda} \bar{m}}{1+\sqrt{\lambda}}$. However, as argued in the previous section, observable signals imply $\frac{\underline{m}+\bar{m}}{2}=\theta$. Thus, the agent estimates incorrectly for any $\lambda \neq 1$. In particular, if $\lambda<1$, her optimal estimate is below the real value of the state: $g^{*}<\theta$. The example above shows how an environment in which an agent estimates correctly can be easily perturbed so that the agent's estimate is no longer consistent.

The above example also highlights that the loss function directly affects the agent's estimate, even asymptotically. Note that a Bayesian decision maker's posterior belief converges to a Dirac measure on the real state. Thus, with multiple Bayesian agents, as the available information grows, regardless of their loss functions, Bayesian agents will agree on the optimal estimation of the state. ${ }^{9}$ By contrast, our agent's asymptotic estimate continues to depend on the particular form of the loss function. Thus, am-

[^8]biguity about the precision of information sources might rationalize disagreement even between informed experts who aim to find out the truth, for example, scientists with access to the same large dataset.

## 5 Implications

We now turn to different implications of our main result.

### 5.1 Comparative Statics of Ambiguity

First, we show that contrary to intuition, making all signals more precise is not necessarily beneficial to the decision maker. For simplicity, we consider the case of symmetric loss functions and observable signals.

Recall that by Theorem 1, the limit set of posteriors is a set of degenerate distributions $\delta_{b}$ with $\underline{m} \leq b \leq \bar{m}$, where

$$
\bar{m}=\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}} x d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{\bar{m}}^{\infty} x d F(x)}{\underline{\rho} F(\bar{m})+\bar{\rho}(1-F(\bar{m}))}, \quad \underline{m}=\frac{\bar{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\underline{m}} x d F(x)+\underline{\rho} \int_{\underline{m}}^{\infty} x d F(x)}{\bar{\rho} F(\underline{m})+\underline{\rho}(1-F(\underline{m}))} .
$$

To see how the set of precisions deemed possible by the decision maker affects the limit set of posterior beliefs, first note $\bar{m}$ and $\underline{m}$ only depend on the fraction of the highest and the lowest possible precisions, instead of their absolute values, because we can rewrite $\bar{m}$ and $\underline{m}$ as

$$
\bar{m}=\frac{\int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}} x d F(x)+\eta \int_{\bar{m}}^{\infty} x d F(x)}{F(\bar{m})+\eta(1-F(\bar{m}))}, \quad \underline{m}=\frac{\eta \int_{-\infty}^{\underline{m}} x d F(x)+\int_{\underline{m}}^{\infty} x d F(x)}{\eta F(\underline{m})+(1-F(\underline{m}))},
$$

where $\eta=\frac{\bar{\rho}}{\underline{\rho}}$. The following proposition shows that both $\bar{m}$ and $\underline{m}$ change with $\eta$ monotonically.

Proposition 1. Let $\eta=\frac{\bar{\rho}}{\rho} \in(1,+\infty)$. Under observable signals, $\bar{m}$ is monotonically increasing in $\eta$ and $\underline{m}$ is monotonically decreasing in $\eta$. Moreover, when $\eta \rightarrow+\infty$, we have $\bar{m} \rightarrow \infty$ and $\underline{m} \rightarrow-\infty$; when $\eta \rightarrow 1$, we have $\bar{m}-\underline{m} \rightarrow 0$.

In Proposition 1, $\eta=\frac{\bar{\rho}}{\rho}$ can be interpreted as the degree of ambiguity in the set of possible precisions $[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]$. When more ambiguity exists regarding precisions of signals ex-ante, the limit set of posteriors also expands, and hence, ambiguity regarding states is greater ex-post.

Now, we explore the welfare implication of such comparative statics. By Corollary 1 of Theorem 2, the decision maker always estimates correctly at the limit when signals are observable. Thus, the optimal utility depends solely on the size of the limit set of posterior means, that is, $\bar{m}-\underline{m}$. Corollary 2 directly follows from Proposition 1.

Corollary 2. Let $u$ be symmetric. Under observable signals, as $\eta$ increases, the decision maker is strictly worse off asymptotically.

Corollary 2 has two possibly counterintuitive implications. First, it implies that if we fix $\underline{\rho}$ and increase $\bar{\rho}$, the decision maker is strictly worse off. That is, she prefers all of her signals to be imprecise to the possibility of some signals being more precise. Second, consider two decision problems with the set of possible precisions given by $\left[\underline{\rho}_{1}, \bar{\rho}_{1}\right]$ and $\left[\underline{\rho}_{2}, \bar{\rho}_{2}\right]$, respectively. If $\underline{\rho}_{2}>\bar{\rho}_{1}$ and $\eta_{1}=\frac{\bar{\rho}_{1}}{\underline{\rho}_{1}}<\eta_{2}=\frac{\bar{\rho}_{2}}{\underline{\rho}_{2}}$, the decision maker believes that any signal in the second decision problem is more precise than any signal in the first one, but she is strictly worse off in the second decision problem. This result shows that making all signals more precise is not necessarily beneficial to the decision maker.

### 5.2 Comparative Statics of Reality

In this section, we study how asymptotic ambiguity and the decision maker's estimate change when the distribution of real precisions varies. As in the previous section, assume signals are directly observable. We fix the perceived precisions $\underline{\rho}$ and $\bar{\rho}$, and we let $G$ and $H$ be distributions of real precisions generating asymptotic belief boundaries $\left\{\underline{m}_{G}, \bar{m}_{G}\right\}$ and $\left\{\underline{m}_{H}, \bar{m}_{H}\right\}$, respectively.

Proposition 2. If the distribution of precisions G first-order stochastically dominates $H$, then the asymptotic belief set is larger for $H$. Formally, for any state $\theta \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$
H \leq_{F O S D} G \Longrightarrow \underline{m}_{H} \leq \underline{m}_{G} \leq \bar{m}_{G} \leq \bar{m}_{H} .
$$

In other words, conditional on the state, information sources with lower precision imply a larger asymptotic ambiguity set for the decision maker. Intuitively, if the precision of the real information sources is decreased, the distribution of signals generated by those information sources becomes more dispersed and less informative for the true state. This enlarges the set of possible posteriors by thickening the tails of the signal distribution. Proposition 2 formalizes this idea.

This result has a significant implication for asymptotic estimates. The asymptotic loss of a Bayesian decision maker is always zero, regardless of the distribution of precisions, because their belief converges to a degenerate distribution centered on the true value, $\theta$. Because signals are unbiased, a Bayesian decision maker has zero loss even if she does not know the distribution of precisions. However, the distribution of precisions is crucial for an ambiguous decision maker. While a Bayesian decision maker remains consistently correct, it is possible to find distributions of precisions that cause the ambiguous agent to make arbitrarily large estimation errors. Proposition 2 provides a way to construct these large estimation errors: they require that real signals have sufficiently low precision in addition to an asymmetric loss function.

Corollary 3. Assume signals are observable and $u$ is the asymmetric quadratic loss function in Section 4.1 with any $\lambda \neq 1$. For any $\eta>1$ and any constant $C>0$, true distributions of precisions $G$ exist such that $\left|g^{*}-\theta\right|>C$.

### 5.3 Aggregating Estimates

Next, we study the problem of an ambiguity-averse econometrician who aims to estimate the state by aggregating estimates from many Bayesian
agents. The agents share the same prior but have access to different information sources. Although the econometrician knows the prior distribution of the state, she does not know the precision of the individual sources. This environment is reasonable in many applications. For instance, consider a healthcare official assessing the prevalence of a disease in a region. She relies on hospital reports to do so but is not sure about the quality of their data-collection protocols.

Formally, we assume all agents and the decision maker share the same prior beliefs about the state $\theta$. As in the previous sections, according to the prior, $\theta \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\mu, \frac{1}{\rho_{\mu}}\right)$. Conditional on the realization of $\theta$, agent $i$ receives a private signal $s_{i}=\theta+\varepsilon_{i}$, where $\varepsilon_{i} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \frac{1}{\rho_{i}}\right)$. That is, each agent receives an unbiased signal about the state. We consider the case in which each agent attempts to estimate the realized value of $\theta$ to minimize the mean-squared error. Given the prior and the private signal, the optimal Bayesian estimate for agent $i$ would then be $\mathbf{a}\left(s_{i}, \rho_{i}\right)=\mathbb{E}\left[\theta \mid \rho_{i}, s_{i}\right]=\frac{\rho_{\mu} \mu+\rho_{i} s_{i}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho_{i}}$. These actions are the ones the econometrician has access to. The setup studied in this section is graphically depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Learning From Actions Setup


Although each agent knows the precision of their private signal, the econometrician does not. We once more assume that for each signal, the
econometrician considers a set of possible precisions $[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]$. Because each action is a convex combination of the private signal $s_{i}$ and the mean of the prior $\mu$, an econometrician who intends to estimate the value of $\theta$, will first have to transform the actions back to signals. For a conjectured precision $\hat{\rho}_{i}$, the recovered signal will be $\mathbf{s}^{\mathbf{a}}\left(a_{i}, \hat{\rho}_{i}\right)=a_{i}+\frac{\rho_{\mu}}{\hat{\rho}_{i}}\left(a_{i}-\mu\right)$. We again assume the loss function of the econometrician is quadratic. We start by utilizing Theorem 1 to characterize the limit set of posteriors of the econometrician in this example.

Proposition 3. Let $\mathbf{a}\left(s_{i}, \rho_{i}\right)=\frac{\rho_{\mu} \mu+\rho_{i} s_{i}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho_{i}}$. The boundaries of the limit set of posteriors for the econometrician are:
$\bar{m}_{a}=\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}_{a}} x d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{\bar{m}_{a}}^{\infty} x d F(x)+c}{\underline{\rho} F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)+\bar{\rho}\left(1-F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)\right)} \quad \underline{m}_{a}=\frac{\bar{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\underline{m}_{a}} x d F(x)+\underline{\rho}^{\underline{m}_{a}}}{\infty} x d F(x)+c$,
where $c=(\theta-\mu) \int \frac{\rho \rho_{\mu}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho} d G(\rho)$.
The boundaries of the limit set of posteriors are defined by a fixed point similar to the one from the example with observable signals. However, here, the econometrician has to backtrack realized signals from observed estimates, which leads to an adjustment term $c$. The next result is a corollary of Theorem 2.

Corollary 4. Let the loss function be quadratic and $\mathbf{a}\left(s_{i}, \rho_{i}\right)=\frac{\rho_{\mu} \mu+\rho_{i} s_{i}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho_{i}}$. For almost all sequences $a$ and values of the state $\theta, \lim _{N \rightarrow \infty}\left|g^{*}\left(a^{N}\right)-\theta\right|>0$.

That is, the econometrician's estimation converges away from the truth almost surely because inverting from observables to signals depends on the conjectured precisions and the prior mean. The lack of knowledge about the former makes distinguishing signal realizations from the prior mean impossible, thus generating a bias in the recovered signals. The following assumption allows us to clearly characterize the optimal estimate and to analyze comparative statics.

Assumption 2. For some $\rho^{*} \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}], G=\delta_{\rho^{*}}$.

Although the econometrician might consider different precisions for each signal, under Assumption 2, in reality, all signals share the same precision. This assumption allows us to characterize how the econometrician estimate differs from the true parameter value. We say the econometrician overreacts if $\left|g^{*}-\mu\right|>|\theta-\mu|$ and underreacts if the inequality is reversed. In other words, an estimation overreacts to information if it is further from the real state than the prior mean.

Proposition 4 (Guess Characterization). Let $\mathbf{a}\left(s_{i}, \rho_{i}\right)=\frac{\rho_{\mu} \mu+\rho_{i} s_{i}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho_{i}}$ and the loss function be quadratic. Under Assumption 2, $g\left(A^{n}\right) \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} g^{*}$, where

1. If $\mu=\theta, g^{*}=\theta$
2. If $\mu \neq \theta$, then $\exists \tilde{\rho}<\tilde{\rho}$ such that

- If $\rho^{*} \leq \tilde{\rho}$, then $\left|g^{*}-\mu\right|>|\theta-\mu|$ and the agent underreacts to observed actions
- If $\rho^{*} \geq \tilde{\rho},\left|g^{*}-\mu\right|<|\theta-\mu|$ and the agent overreacts to observed actions
- If $\tilde{\rho}<\rho^{*}<\tilde{\rho}$, underreacting if $|\theta-\mu|$ is small and overreacting if $|\theta-\mu|$ is large,
where: $\quad \tilde{\rho}=\frac{2 \underline{\rho} \bar{\rho}}{\underline{\rho}+\bar{\rho}} \quad \tilde{\rho}=\underline{\rho} F(\bar{m}(\tilde{\rho}, \mu))+\bar{\rho}(1-F(\bar{m}(\tilde{\rho}, \mu))$.

Proposition 4 reveals that whether the decision maker over- or underreacts depends on the true precision of the signals and possibly the realization of the state $\theta$. Roughly speaking, the optimal robust estimate corresponds to the decision maker trying to backtrack the mean of the unobservable signals from the mean of observed actions. Because signals are unbiased, their unobservable mean is effectively $\theta$, the state the econometrician aims to estimate. When $\rho^{*}$ is high, $\theta$ is relatively close to the mean of actions because the agents place a high weight on their unbiased signals when choosing their actions. However, the econometrician does not know the real precision, so she backtracks signals from actions using roughly the same method
regardless of what $\rho^{*}$ is. Therefore, the direction of her estimation error depends on the true precision.

Finally, as the prior precision $\rho_{\mu}$ changes, the accuracy of the optimal estimate is not monotonic. The estimation error is related to how actions are contaminated by the prior, making it impossible for the agent to disentangle the effect of the prior from the effect of individual information. When the prior is extremely imprecise, $\rho_{\mu} \approx 0$, this contamination is minimal, and the optimal estimate is approximately equal to the one in the observable signals example: the econometrician estimates correctly. On the other hand, when the precision of the prior grows to infinity, $\rho_{\mu} \rightarrow \infty$, the agent also estimates correctly by essentially disregarding the information in the observed actions. For intermediate values, however, Corollary 4 implies that the estimate is wrong almost surely. In other words, the accuracy of the estimate is not monotonic with the precision of the prior: better information ex-ante does not guarantee a more correct estimate asymptotically.

## 6 Discussion

To maintain tractability and clarity, our analysis has relied on four main assumptions: (i) the decision maker adopts full Bayesian updating; (ii) the decision maker only knows the highest possible and lowest possible precisions of each information source and nothing else; (iii) both the state and signals follow normal distributions; and (iv) the decision maker is a MEU maximizer regarding ambiguity. In this section, we briefly argue our main result - that ambiguity does not vanish asymptotically - remains valid when we relax the last three assumptions. Hence, the essential assumption is the updating rule under ambiguity.

Updating Rule. First, we note our result does rely on the updating rule under ambiguity. An alternative to the full Bayesian updating rule is the maximum-likelihood rule. Unlike full Bayesian updating, where the decision maker applies Bayes' rule to the entire set of priors, the decision maker with the maximum-likelihood rule would discard priors that do not ascribe
the maximal probability to the observed signals and update the remaining priors according to Bayes' rule. Hence, the maximum-likelihood rule suggests that ambiguity might vanish even with one single signal. There are also intermediate cases between full Bayesian and maximum-likelihood updating. Under the likelihood-ratio updating rule in Epstein and Schneider (2007), asymptotic beliefs will generically coincide with those under maximum-likelihood, except in the extreme case when this rule coincides with full Bayesian updating. By comparison, under the relative maximumlikelihood rule introduced by Cheng (2022), asymptotic beliefs would be a convex combination of those under full Bayesian and maximum-likelihood updating, and hence our qualitative results will be maintained.

Information about Precisions Consider the case in which the decision maker has more information about the precisions of her information sources ex-ante. Specifically, the decision maker knows two groups of information sources exist. Group 1 consists of a fraction $\alpha \in[0,1]$ of information sources with shared high precision $\bar{\rho}$, and Group 2 consists of fraction $1-\alpha$ with shared low precision $\rho$. The decision maker does not know which group a particular information source belongs to. ${ }^{10}$ Recall the optimization problem of the decision maker can be interpreted as a zero-sum game between her and nature. The decision maker's additional information heavily restricts nature's choices on precisions. However, when $\alpha \in(0,1)$, nature can still induce the decision maker to have a relatively high (low) posterior mean of the state by assigning high signals to Group 1 (Group 2) subject to the new constraint. Hence, even with the additional restrictions, ambiguity will not asymptotically vanish. The asymptotic estimate of the decision maker will be correct only with observable signals and a symmetric loss function and incorrect otherwise. ${ }^{11}$ Regardless of whether her estimate is

[^9]correct, for any $\alpha \in(0,1)$, the decision maker faces ambiguity and, thus, suffers from a loss. Consequently, a decision maker who believes all her information sources to have minimal precision $\underline{\rho}$, is better off than a decision maker who believes a fraction of her information sources have precision $\bar{\rho}>\underline{\rho}$.

Distributions We have assumed that the state and signals are normally distributed. For general distributions, the precision of each signal is no longer fully captured by the reciprocal of its variance. To extend our model to other distributions, we can assume the decision maker considers a set of likelihood functions for each information source. As in the main model, each allocation of likelihoods to information sources defines a belief for the agent. Under full Bayesian updating, for each belief, the agent forms a posterior on the state. The analysis would be less tractable since higher moments of the posterior no longer necessarily vanish asymptotically, but we conjecture that as long as two different beliefs result in two different posterior means, our results that ambiguity does not vanish hold. We leave the detailed analysis for future research.

Ambiguity Preferences Finally, we can extend the decision maker's preference under ambiguity. As long as the ambiguity the decision maker faces takes the form of a set of beliefs over the state and signals and she adopts the full Bayesian updating rule upon receiving signals, Theorem 1 still holds. Indeed, our analysis of asymptotic beliefs does not rely on the specification of the decision maker's ambiguity preferences. For instance, the decision maker might use the $\alpha$-maxmin expected utility ( $\alpha$-MEU) criterion (Hurwicz, 1951), where she considers the weighted average of each act's worstcase and best-case expected utility. With this preference, the decision maker might not be ambiguity-averse.
has asymptotic loss 0 because no ambiguity exists.

## Appendix: Proofs

## Proof of Lemma 2

By the form of the objective function, it is easy to see that $\hat{\rho}^{*}$ solves $\max _{\hat{\rho}[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}[\theta \mid a, \hat{\rho}]$ or $\min _{\hat{\rho}[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}[\theta \mid a, \hat{\rho}]$.

Given a distribution of observables, $F$ with density $f$, recall that

$$
v(\hat{\rho}) \equiv \mathbb{E}[\theta \mid a, \hat{\rho}]=\int \frac{\hat{\rho}(x) \hat{s}(x, \hat{\rho}(x))}{\int \hat{\rho}(x) f(x) d x} f(x) d x
$$

Fix a value $M \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]$ and consider the problem:

$$
\begin{array}{r}
\max _{\hat{\rho}[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]^{\infty}}\left\{v(\hat{\rho}): \int \hat{\rho}(x) f(x) d x=M\right\} \\
=\frac{1}{M} \max _{\hat{\rho}[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]^{\infty}}\left\{\int \hat{\rho}(x) \hat{s}(x, \hat{\rho}(x)) f(x) d x: \int \hat{\rho}(x) f(x) d x=M\right\}
\end{array}
$$

where the last equality is justified because we are equating the denominator of $v$ to $M$. By Lagrange multiplier Theorem in Banach spaces, we obtain that there is $\lambda$ such that, for each $x$ :

$$
\hat{\rho}(x) \in \arg \max _{\rho \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]}\{\rho \hat{s}(x, \rho)-\lambda(\rho-M)\} .
$$

By the supermodularity in Assumption 1, we know the objective function of each of these optimizations is supermodular, so $\hat{\rho}(x)$ is increasing with $x$, according to Topkis' lemma. By affinity, the solution can be assumed to be an extreme point of the interval $[\rho, \bar{\rho}]$. Therefore, for each $M$ the solution is a threshold. Thus, maximizing over M's the solution must also be a threshold. Clearly, the same result holds for minimization, and the proof is concluded.

Lemma 1 is a special case of Lemma 2 and hence is also proved.

## Proof of Theorem 1

For any realization of observables $a^{N}$, let $F^{N} \in \Delta(\mathbb{R})$ be the empirical distribution of observables. We abuse notation to write $s^{a}\left(a^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right)$ as the vector in which the i-th entry is $s^{a}\left(a_{i}^{N}, \hat{\rho}_{i}^{N}\right)$. Given a conjecture $\hat{\rho}^{N}$, we know the backtracked signals $s^{a}\left(a_{i}^{N}, \hat{\rho}_{i}^{N}\right)$ are jointly normal with the state, allowing us to calculate the posterior mean as:

$$
\mathbb{E}\left[\theta \mid a^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right]=\frac{\hat{\rho}^{N} \cdot s^{a}\left(a^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right)+\rho_{\mu} \mu}{\hat{\rho}^{N} \cdot \mathbb{1}+\rho_{\mu}}
$$

Define:

$$
\underline{m}^{N} \equiv \min _{\hat{\rho} \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]^{N}} \mathbb{E}\left[\theta \mid a^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right], \quad \bar{m}^{N} \equiv \max _{\hat{\rho} \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]^{N}} \mathbb{E}\left[\theta \mid s^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right] .
$$

The above $\underline{m}^{N}$ and $\bar{m}^{N}$ are (random) bounds on posterior means. Assume that $\underline{\rho}^{N}$ and $\bar{\rho}^{N}$ are the respective maximizers.

Let $\hat{\rho}: \overline{\mathbb{R}} \rightarrow[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]$ be a precision assignment. Let $F$ be the real distribution of observables. Again, given a precision assignment, signals are jointly normally distributed with the state, so we can write the posterior mean as:

$$
\mathbb{E}[\theta \mid \hat{\rho}]=\int \frac{\hat{\rho}(x) s^{a}(x, \hat{\rho}(x)) d F(x)}{\int \hat{\rho}(x) d F(x)}
$$

Finally, let:

$$
\underline{m}=\min _{\hat{\rho}: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]} \mathbb{E}[\theta \mid \hat{\rho}], \bar{m}=\min _{\hat{\rho}: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]} \mathbb{E}[\theta \mid \hat{\rho}] .
$$

We start the proof by showing, in Step 1, that the random bounds on posterior means converge to $\underline{m}$ and $\bar{m}$ asymptotically. Then, we show that the latter are indeed asymptotic bounds of posterior means, proving part 1 of the Theorem in Step 2.

Step 1. $\underline{m}^{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \underline{m}$ and $\bar{m}^{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \bar{m}$

Step 1.1. $\bar{m}=\frac{\rho_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}} s^{a}(x, \underline{\rho}) d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{\bar{m}}^{\infty} s^{a}(x, \bar{\rho}) d F(x)}{\underline{\rho F}(\bar{m})+\bar{\rho}(1-F(\bar{m}))}$
By the proof of Lemma 2, $\underline{m}$ is solved by a threshold strategy. We can then write the optimization that determines it by:

$$
\bar{m}=\arg \max _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\{v(a)\},
$$

where $v(a)=\frac{\rho \int_{-\infty}^{a} s^{a}(x, \underline{\rho}) d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{a}^{\infty} s^{a}(x, \bar{\rho}) d F(x)}{\underline{\rho F(a)+\bar{\rho}(1-F(a))}}$.
The first order condition leads to:

$$
\bar{m}=\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}} s^{a}(x, \underline{\rho}) d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{\bar{m}}^{\infty} s^{a}(x, \bar{\rho}) d F(x)}{\underline{\rho F}(\bar{m})+\bar{\rho}(1-F(\bar{m}))}
$$

which implicitly defines the value $\underline{m}$ that solves that maximization. We show that the objective function is single-peaked, so that the first order condition is necessary and sufficient. The first derivative of $v$ can be written as:

$$
v^{\prime}(a)=(v(a)-a) \frac{(\bar{\rho}-\underline{\rho}) f(a)}{\underline{\rho} F(a)+\bar{\rho}(1-F(a))}
$$

First, notice that because the second term is positive for all $a \in \mathbb{R}$, the sign of $v^{\prime}$ is determined by $v(a)-a$. This immediately implies $v$ is quasiconcave: if there is $\underline{a}$ such that $v^{\prime}(\underline{a})>0$, then $v^{\prime}(a)>0$ for all $a \leq \underline{a}$; similarly, if there is $\bar{a}$ such that $v^{\prime}(\bar{a})<0$, then $v^{\prime}(a)<0$ for all $a \geq \bar{a}$. We prove the second, the first follows by symmetry. Assume there is $\bar{a}$ such that $v^{\prime}(\bar{a})<0$ and, to obtain a contradiction, let there be $a>\bar{a}$ with $v^{\prime}(a)>0$. Since $v^{\prime}$ is continuous, there must be $\bar{a}<b<a$ with $v^{\prime}(b)=0$, which implies $v(b)=b$. Choose the smallest such $b>\bar{a}$, so for $\bar{a} \leq x<b, v^{\prime}(x)<0$. We then have:

$$
0=v(b)-b<v(b)-\bar{a}=v(\bar{a})-\bar{a}+\int_{\bar{a}}^{b} v^{\prime}(x) d x<0
$$

since $v^{\prime}(\bar{a})<0$ implies $v(\bar{a})<\bar{a}$. We have thus obtained a contradiction.

Because $v$ is quasiconcave, the first order condition is necessary and sufficient. We now prove that the solution exists and is unique.

As $a \rightarrow-\infty, v(a) \rightarrow \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} x f(x) d x$, as all signals are assigned precision $\bar{\rho}$, leading to uniform weighting. Because we know $F$ has a finite mean, that implies that we can find a sufficiently small number $\underline{a}$ such that $v(\underline{a})-\underline{a}>0$, implying $v^{\prime}(\underline{a})>0$. Notice that the same should be true for all $a \leq \underline{a}$, so that $v$ is an increasing function in $(-\infty, \underline{a}]$.

On the other hand, as $a \rightarrow \infty$, again we have $v(a) \rightarrow \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} x f(x) d x$, this time because all signals are receiving precision $\underline{\rho}$. Then, there is a sufficiently high number $\bar{a}$ with $v(a)-a<0$, so $v^{\prime}(a)<\overline{0}$ for all $a \geq \overline{(a)}$.

Because $v^{\prime}$ is continuous, there is $a^{*} \in[\underline{a}, \bar{a}]$ with $v^{\prime}\left(a^{*}\right)=0$, so the solution exists. We now prove uniqueness. Let $a^{\prime}$ satisfy $v^{\prime}\left(a^{\prime}\right)=0$, and let $a^{\prime}>a^{*}$ without loss of generality. By the quasiconcavity argument above, $v^{\prime}(x)=0$ for all $x \in\left[a^{*}, a^{\prime}\right]$. Then:

$$
0=v\left(a^{\prime}\right)-a^{\prime}<v\left(a^{\prime}\right)-a^{*}=v\left(a^{*}\right)-a^{*}+\int_{a^{*}}^{a^{\prime}} v^{\prime}(x) d x=0
$$

again, yielding a contradiction. Therefore $a^{*}$ is unique. This concludes Step 1.1 By symmetry, we have the definition of $\underline{m}$.

Step 1.2. Approximating $\bar{m}^{N}$ using a threshold. In this step we show how to approximate the expectation $\bar{m}^{N}$ by the expectation generated by a threshold strategy as $N$ grows large. For any realization of actions, $a^{N}$, let $F^{N}$ be the associated empirical distribution of actions. We then define:

$$
\tilde{m}^{N}=\max _{a \in \mathbb{R}} \frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{a} s^{a}(x, \underline{\rho}) d F^{N}(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{a}^{\infty} s^{a}(x, \bar{\rho}) d F^{N}(x)}{\underline{\rho} F^{N}(a)+\bar{\rho}\left(1-F^{N}(a)\right)}
$$

Call the objective function of the problem above $\Psi^{N}(a)$. At the same time, using the proof of Lemma 2 without assuming the distribution of observables is non-atomic, we obtain that $\bar{m}^{N}$ can be obtained by an assignment that is a threshold except for possibly one of the observables receiving
an intermediate precision. Thus, we can find $\bar{m}^{N}$ through the alternative optimization:

$$
\bar{m}^{N}=\max _{a, \rho \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]}\left\{\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{a-} s^{a}(x, \underline{\rho}) d F^{N}(x)+\rho s^{a}(a, \rho)\left(F^{N}(a)-F^{N}(a-)\right)+\bar{\rho} \int_{a}^{\infty} s^{a}(x, \bar{\rho}) d F^{N}(x)+\frac{\rho_{\mu}}{N} \mu}{\underline{\rho} F^{N}(a-)+\rho\left(F^{N}(a)-F^{N}(a-)\right)+\bar{\rho}\left(1-F^{N}(a)\right)+\frac{\rho_{\mu}}{N}}\right\}
$$

We call the objective function above $\tilde{\Psi}^{N}(a, \rho)$. We next prove $\sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}, \rho \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]} \mid \tilde{\Psi}^{N}(a, \rho)-$ $\Psi^{N}(a) \mid \xrightarrow{a . s} 0$. To see that, notice that for almost all sequences $a$, it must be that $\sup _{a}\left\{F^{N}(a)-F^{N}(a-)\right\} \leq \frac{1}{N}$. Applying that, the uniform convergence result is direct.

Denote

$$
\Psi(a)=\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{a} s^{a}(x, \underline{\rho}) d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{a}^{\infty} s^{a}(x, \bar{\rho}) d F(x)}{\underline{\rho} F(a)+\bar{\rho}(1-F(a))}
$$

where $F$ is, again, the true distribution of observables.

Step 1.3. $\sup _{\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{R}}\left|\Psi^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathbf{a})-\Psi(\mathbf{a})\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \mathbf{0}$ Given the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem, we know the empirical distribution function converges to the true cumulative distribution function uniformly over $x$, that is,

$$
\left\|F^{N}-F\right\|:=\sup _{x \in \mathbb{R}}\left|F^{N}(x)-F(x)\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} 0 .
$$

For each real-valued function $v$, denote

$$
F^{N}(v)=\int v d F^{N}, F(v)=\int v d F .
$$

A class of real-valued functions $\mathcal{V}$ is defined to be a P-Glivenko-Cantelli class of functions if

$$
\left\|F^{N}-F\right\|_{\mathcal{V}}:=\sup _{v \in \mathcal{V}}\left|F^{N}(v)-F(v)\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} 0 .
$$

Recall that the $L_{1}(F)$ norm is defined for real-valued functions such that

$$
\|v\|_{L_{1}(F)}=\int|v| d F
$$

Given two real-valued functions $l$ and $u$ and $\epsilon>0$, a $\varepsilon$-bracket $[l, u]$ is the set of all functions $f$ such that $l \leq f \leq u$ and $\|u-l\|_{L_{1}(F)} \leq \varepsilon$. The bracketing number $N\left(\varepsilon, \mathcal{V},\|\cdot\|_{L_{1}(F)}\right)$ is the minimum number of $\varepsilon$-brackets needed to cover $\mathcal{V}$. The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for a P -Glivenko-Cantelli class.

Theorem 3. ( (Blum, 1955; DeHardt, 1971)) If $N\left(\varepsilon, \mathcal{V},\|\cdot\|_{L_{1}(F)}\right)<\infty$ for any $\varepsilon>0$, then $\mathcal{V}$ is a P-Glivenko-Cantelli class.

Denote

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathcal{V}_{1}=\left\{v_{1}^{a}: v_{1}^{a}(x)=\underline{\rho} \mathbb{1}_{\{x \leq a\}}+\bar{\rho} \mathbb{1}_{\{x>a\}}, \forall x \in \mathbb{R}, \text { for some } a \in \mathbb{R}\right\} . \\
& \mathcal{V}_{2}=\left\{v_{2}^{a}: v_{2}^{a}(x)=\underline{\rho} x \mathbb{1}_{\{x \leq a\}}+\bar{\rho} x \mathbb{1}_{\{x>a\}}, \forall x \in \mathbb{R}, \text { for some } a \in \mathbb{R}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Easy to see

$$
\Psi^{N}(a)=\frac{F^{N}\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)}{F^{N}\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)}, \quad \Psi(a)=\frac{F\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)}{F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)} .
$$

Then we want to show that $\mathcal{V}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{V}_{2}$ are both P-Glivenko-Cantelli classes. Note that $F$ is a continuous distribution whose expectation is well-defined, that is, $\int|x| d F<\infty$.

Fix $\varepsilon>0$. For any $a>b$, the $L_{1}(F)$-distance between $v_{1}^{a}$ and $v_{1}^{b}$ is

$$
\left\|v_{1}^{a}-v_{1}^{b}\right\|_{L_{1}(F)}=(\bar{\rho}-\underline{\rho}) \int_{b}^{a} d F(x) .
$$

Since $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} d F(x)=1$, for $M$ large enough, we can find a finite increasing sequence $\left\{a_{1}, \ldots, a_{M}\right\}$ on the extended real line such that $a_{1}=-\infty, a_{M}=\infty$ and

$$
\int_{a_{i}}^{a_{i+1}} d F(x)=\frac{1}{M-1} \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{\bar{\rho}-\underline{\rho}}, \forall i=1, \ldots, M-1
$$

This is feasible as $F$ is a continuous distribution. Then it is easy to show that the set of $\varepsilon$-brackets $\left\{\left[v_{1}^{a_{i}}, v_{1}^{a_{i+1}}\right]: i=1, \ldots, M-1\right\} \operatorname{covers} \mathcal{V}_{1}$ and $N\left(\varepsilon, \mathcal{V}_{1}, \|\right.$. $\left.\|_{L_{1}(F)}\right) \leq M-1<\infty$. Hence $\mathcal{V}_{1}$ is a P-Glivenko-Cantelli class.

Similarly, for any $a>b$, the $L_{1}(F)$-distance between $v_{2}^{a}$ and $v_{2}^{b}$ is

$$
\left\|v_{2}^{a}-v_{2}^{b}\right\|_{L_{1}(P)}=(\bar{\rho}-\underline{\rho}) \int_{b}^{a}|x| d F(x) .
$$

Since $\int|x| d F<\infty$ and $F$ is continuous, for $M^{\prime}$ large enough, again we can fine a finite increasing sequence $\left\{b_{1}, \ldots, b_{M}\right\}$ on extended real line such that $b_{1}=-\infty, b_{M^{\prime}}=\infty$ and

$$
\int_{b_{i}}^{b_{i+1}}|x| d F(x)=\frac{\int|x| d F}{M^{\prime}-1} \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{\bar{\rho}-\underline{\rho}}, \forall i=1, \ldots, M^{\prime}-1
$$

Then it is easy to show that the set of $\varepsilon$-brackets $\left\{\left[v_{2}^{b_{i}}, v_{2}^{b_{i+1}}\right]: i=1, \ldots, M^{\prime}-\right.$ $1\}$ covers $\mathcal{F}_{2}$ and $N\left(\varepsilon, \mathcal{V}_{2},\|\cdot\|_{L_{1}(F)}\right) \leq M^{\prime}-1<\infty$. Hence $\mathcal{V}_{2}$ is a P-GlivenkoCantelli class.

The definition of the P-Glivenko-Cantelli class implies that

$$
\begin{align*}
& \left\|F^{N}-F\right\|_{\mathcal{V}_{1}}=\sup _{v \in \mathcal{V}_{1}}\left|F^{N}(v)-F(v)\right|=\sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\left|F^{N}\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)-F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} 0 .  \tag{1}\\
& \left\|F^{N}-F\right\|_{\mathcal{V}_{1}}=\sup _{v \in \mathcal{V}_{1}}\left|F^{N}(v)-F(v)\right|=\sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\left|F^{N}\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)-F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} 0 . \tag{2}
\end{align*}
$$

Now we can show the convergence of $\Psi^{N}$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\left|\Psi^{N}(a)-\Psi(a)\right| & =\sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\left|\frac{F^{N}\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)}{F^{n}\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)}-\frac{F\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)}{F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)}\right| \\
& \leq \sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\left|\frac{F^{N}\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)}{F^{N}\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)}-\frac{F^{N}\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)}{F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)}\right|+\sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\left|\frac{F^{N}\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)}{F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)}-\frac{F\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)}{F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)}\right| \\
& \leq \sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\left|\frac{F^{N}\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)}{F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right) F^{N}\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)}\right|\left|F^{N}\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)-F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)\right|+\sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}} \frac{1}{\left|F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)\right|}\left|F^{N}\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)-F\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)\right| \\
& \leq \sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\left|\frac{F^{N}\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)}{F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right) F^{N}\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)}\right| \sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\left|F^{N}\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)-F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)\right|+\sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}} \frac{1}{\left|F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)\right|} \sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\left|F^{N}\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)-F\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)\right| .
\end{aligned}
$$

Notice that $0<\underline{\rho} \leq F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right) \leq \bar{\rho}<\infty$ and $0<\underline{\rho} \leq F^{N}\left(v_{1}^{a}\right) \leq \bar{\rho}<\infty$ for each $N$. That is, $F\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)$ and $\overline{F^{N}}\left(v_{1}^{a}\right)$ are uniformly bounded away from 0 and $\infty$. Also, by applying strong law of large numbers,

$$
\sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\left|F^{N}\left(v_{2}^{a}\right)\right| \leq(\underline{\rho}+\bar{\rho}) \int|x| d F^{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }}(\underline{\rho}+\bar{\rho}) \int|x| d F<+\infty .
$$

By equations 1 and 2, we know

$$
\sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\left|\Psi^{N}(a)-\Psi(a)\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} 0 .
$$

Step 1.4. $\bar{m}^{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \bar{m}$ This result follows directly from the following standard results about consistency of $M$ - estimators. We include the proof for completeness.

Lemma 3. Suppose that

1. $\sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}, \rho \in[\rho, \bar{\rho}]}\left|\tilde{\Psi}^{N}(a, \rho)-\Psi(a)\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} 0$,
2. $\bar{m}_{N} \in \arg \max _{a \in \mathbb{R}, \rho \in[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]} \tilde{\Psi}^{N}(a, \rho)$ for each $N$,
3. $\bar{m}=\arg \max _{a \in \mathbb{R}} \Psi(a)$ is the unique maximum of $\Psi$,

Then $\bar{m}_{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \bar{m}$.

Proof of Lemma 3. We ignore the argument $\rho$ throughout the proof without loss of generality. By conditions (2) and (3), we know $\tilde{\Psi}^{N}\left(\bar{m}_{N}\right) \geq \tilde{\Psi}^{N}(\bar{m})$ and $\Psi(\bar{m}) \geq \Psi\left(\bar{m}_{N}\right)$ for each $N$. Using these inequalities we have

$$
\tilde{\Psi}^{N}\left(\bar{m}_{N}\right)-\Psi\left(\bar{m}_{N}\right) \geq \tilde{\Psi}^{N}\left(\bar{m}_{N}\right)-\Psi(\bar{m}) \geq \tilde{\Psi}^{N}(\bar{m})-\Psi(\bar{m})
$$

Therefore from the above we have

$$
\left|\tilde{\Psi}^{N}\left(\bar{m}_{N}\right)-\Psi(\bar{m})\right| \geq \max \left\{\left|\tilde{\Psi}^{N}\left(\bar{m}_{N}\right)-\Psi\left(\bar{m}_{N}\right)\right|,\left|\tilde{\Psi}^{N}(\bar{m})-\Psi(\bar{m})\right|\right\} \geq \sup _{a \in \mathbb{R}}\left|\tilde{\Psi}^{N}(a)-\Psi(a)\right|
$$

Hence by condition (1), we know $\left|\tilde{\Psi}^{N}\left(\bar{m}_{N}\right)-\Psi(\bar{m})\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} 0$. Finally, suppose by contradiction that $\bar{m}_{N}$ does not converge to $\bar{m}$ almost surely. Then there exists an event $M$ with positive probability such that for all $\omega \in M$, $\bar{m}_{N}(\omega) \nrightarrow \bar{m}(\omega)$. As $\bar{m}$ is the unique minimum of $\Psi$ by condition (3), $\tilde{\Psi}\left(\bar{m}_{N}(\omega)\right) \nrightarrow$ $\Psi(\bar{m}(\omega))$. Again condition (1) implies that $\left|\tilde{\Psi}^{N}\left(\bar{m}_{N}\right)-\Psi\left(\bar{m}_{N}\right)\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} 0$. Hence we know that there exists $M^{\prime} \subseteq M$ with positive probability such that for all $\omega \in M^{\prime}, \tilde{\Psi}^{N}\left(\bar{m}_{N}(\omega)\right) \nrightarrow \Psi(\bar{m}(\omega))$, which contradicts with $\mid \tilde{\Psi}^{N}\left(\bar{m}_{N}\right)$ $\Psi(\bar{m}) \mid \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} 0$. Thus, we have $\bar{m}_{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \bar{m}$.

Now it suffices to show that the conditions in Lemma 3 holds in our case. Condition (1) is shown in Step 1.2 and 1.3. Explicitly: $\sup _{a, \rho} \mid \tilde{\Psi}^{N}(a, \rho)-$ $\Psi(a) \mid \xrightarrow{\text { a.s }} 0$ and $\sup _{a}\left|\Psi^{N}(a)-\Psi(a)\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} 0$ imply that condition. Condition (2) holds by the definition of $\bar{m}_{N}$. Condition (3) is shown in the proof of Step 1.1. This completes the proof for $\bar{m}_{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \bar{m}$. The same arguments apply for showing $\underline{m}_{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \underline{m}$.

Step 2. Part 1 of Theorem - Boundedness of belief means. For any $N$, with observables $a^{N}$ and conjectured precisions $\hat{\rho}^{N}$, recall we have:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\theta \mid s^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N} \sim\left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i} s^{a}\left(a_{i}, \hat{\rho}_{i}\right)+\rho_{\mu} \mu}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i}+\rho_{\mu}},\left(1-\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i}+\rho_{\mu}}\right) \frac{1}{\rho_{\mu}}\right) \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Since $\hat{\rho}_{i} \geq \underline{\rho}>0$, it is clear that $\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i}+\rho_{\mu}}=1$, so the variance
converges to zero for all sequences of signal realizations.
As for the posterior mean, notice that, by definition of $\underline{m}^{N}, \bar{m}^{N}$ :

$$
\underline{m}^{N} \leq \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i} s^{a}\left(a_{i}, \hat{\rho}_{i}\right)+\rho_{\mu} \mu}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i}+\rho_{\mu}} \leq \bar{m}^{N}
$$

By taking limit inferior in the first inequality above and limit superior in the second, we obtain, using the result in Step 2, that for almost all sequences of signal realizations, the asymptotic bounds on expected values hold.

Step 3. Part 2 of Theorem -Limit Set of Posteriors Fix a sequence of realizations $a$. We want to characterize the set of distributions the posterior beliefs of the decision maker converge to, $\mathbb{P}_{\infty}(a)$. By 3 , it is clear that a necessary condition for weak convergence is that the posterior mean $\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i} s^{a}\left(a_{i}, \hat{\rho}_{i}\right)+\rho_{\mu} \mu}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i}+\rho_{\mu}}$ converges. We can then focus on sequences with converging means. Define $b=\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i} s^{a}\left(a_{i}, \hat{\rho}_{i}\right)+\rho_{\mu} \mu}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i}+\rho_{\mu}}$.

We can write the characteristic function of $P_{N}\left(s^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right)$ as:

$$
\varphi^{N}(t)=e^{i t\left\{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i} a^{a^{\prime}}\left(a_{i}, \hat{\beta}_{i}\right)+\rho_{\mu} \mu}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{p}_{i}+\rho_{\mu}}-\frac{1}{2}\left(1-\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{i}+\rho_{\mu}}\right) \frac{1}{\rho_{\mu}}\right\}}
$$

By Step 2, the variance converges to zero. We then have, for all $t$ :

$$
\varphi^{N}(t) \rightarrow e^{i t b}
$$

which is the characteristic function of $\delta_{b}$. Then, by Levy's continuity theorem: $P_{N}\left(s^{N}, \hat{\rho}^{N}\right) \xrightarrow{w} \delta_{b}$.

We finally show that any $b \in[\underline{m}, \bar{m}]$ can be achieved. For that, fix a threshold assignment $\rho: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow\{\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}\}$. Then $\left\{\rho\left(a_{i}\right) s^{a}\left(a_{i}, \rho\left(a_{i}\right)\right)\right\}_{i=1, \ldots}$ is a sequence of independent signals with uniformly bounded variance. Then, by
the strong law of large numbers:

$$
\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \rho\left(s_{i}\right) s^{a}\left(a_{i}, \rho\left(a_{i}\right)\right)+\rho_{\mu} \mu}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \rho\left(s_{i}\right)+\rho_{\mu}}=\frac{N \int \rho(x) s^{a}(x, \rho(x)) d F^{N}(x)+\rho_{\mu} \mu}{N \int \rho(x) d F^{N}(x)+\rho_{\mu}} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \frac{\int \rho(x) s^{a}(x, \rho(x)) d F(x)}{\int \rho(x) d F(x)}
$$

We finish this step by showing that by appropriately choosing the function $\rho, \frac{\int \rho(x) s d F(x)}{\int \rho(x) d F(x)}$ can achieve any point between $\underline{m}$ and $\bar{m}$. To see that, recall that $\bar{m}=\max _{a} \Psi(a)$. It should be clear that $\mu=\min _{a} \Psi(a)$. Since $\Psi$ is continuous, by choosing different $a$ 's any number in $[\mu, \bar{m}]$ can be achieved. Because any $a$ corresponds to a particular threshold assignment $\rho$, this means that $\frac{\int \rho(x) s^{a}(x, \rho(x)) d F(x)}{\int \rho(x) d F(x)}$ can achieve any value in $[\mu, \bar{m}]$. With the symmetric argument for $\underline{m}$ we obtain the result and complete Step 3.

## Proof of Theorem 2

Define

$$
\Gamma^{N}(g) \equiv \max _{p \in \mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)} \mathbb{E}_{p}[u(g-\theta)]
$$

By definition, assuming that the limits exist, we have:

$$
\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty} g^{*}\left(s^{N}\right)=\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty} \arg \min _{g} \Gamma^{N}(g) .
$$

Also denote

$$
\Gamma(g)=\max \{u(g-\bar{m}), u(g-\underline{m})\}
$$

where $\underline{m}$ and $\bar{m}$ are defined in Theorem 1.
We start with introducing an auxiliary problem with finitely many signals by ignoring the effect of any moment of the posterior distribution that is not the mean. Explicitly:

$$
\tilde{\Gamma}^{N}(g) \equiv \max _{p \in \mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)} u\left(g-\mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta]\right)=\max \{u(g-\bar{m}), u(g-\underline{m})\}
$$

where $\bar{m}$ and $\underline{m}$ are defined in Theorem 1 and the equality follows from the fact that $u$ is convex.

The result of the proposition is a consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let $f^{N}$ be a sequence of random mappings such that $x^{N} \in \arg \min _{x \in \mathbb{R}} f^{N}(x)$, for all $N \in \mathbb{N}$. Assume there is another random mapping $f$ and that the following are satisfied:

1. $\sup _{x \in C}\left|f(x)-f^{N}(x)\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s }} 0$, as $N \rightarrow \infty$, for all compact sets $C \subset \mathbb{R}$.
2. $x^{*} \in \arg \min _{x \in \mathbb{R}} f(x)$ is the unique minimum of $f$.
3. The sequence $x^{N}$ is uniformly bounded almost everywhere.

Then $x^{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} x^{*}$.
Proof of Lemma 4. By condition (3), there exists an event $M$ with $\mathbb{P}(M)=1$ such that for all $\omega \in M$, there is a compact set $C(\omega) \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ with $\left\{x^{N}(\omega)\right\}_{N \geq 1} \cup$ $\left\{x^{*}(\omega)\right\} \subseteq C(\omega)$. By condition (1), we can find $M^{\prime} \subseteq M$ with $\mathbb{P}\left(M^{\prime}\right)=1$ such that for all $\omega \in M^{\prime}, \sup _{x \in C(\omega)}\left|f(x)-f^{N}(x)\right| \rightarrow 0$. Easy to see that $x^{*}$ is the unique minimum of $f$ on $C(\omega)$ and $x^{N}$ is a minimum of $f^{N}$ on $C(\omega)$. Following the same proof of Lemma 3, we know for all $\omega \in M^{\prime}, x^{N}(\omega) \rightarrow x^{*}(\omega)$, which implies $x^{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s }} x^{*}$.

In the remainder of this proof, we aim to show that $\Gamma^{N}, \Gamma, g^{N} \equiv g^{*}\left(s^{N}\right)$ and $g^{*}$ solving $u\left(g^{*}-\bar{m}\right)=u\left(g^{*}-\underline{m}\right)$ satisfy the conditions of Lemma 4. We do so in three steps, one for each condition in the lemma. This allows us to obtain that $g^{*}\left(s^{N}\right) \xrightarrow{\text { a.s }} g^{*}$.

Step 1. $\sup _{\mathbf{g} \in \mathrm{C}}\left|\Gamma(\mathbf{g})-\Gamma^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathbf{g})\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \mathbf{0}$, as $n \rightarrow \infty$, for all compact sets $C \subset \mathbb{R}$
Step 1.1. $\sup _{\mathbf{g} \in \mathbb{R}}\left|\tilde{\Gamma}^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathbf{g})-\Gamma^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathbf{g})\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \mathbf{0}$
We start by using the auxiliary function $\tilde{\Gamma}^{N}$. As $N$ grows to infinity, the gap between $\Gamma^{N}$ and $\tilde{\Gamma}^{N}$ shrinks uniformly. We prove this statement next. Start by noticing that, for fixed $P^{N}$, for any $p \in \mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)$ :

$$
\Gamma^{N}(g) \geq \mathbb{E}_{p}[u(g-\theta)] \geq u\left(g-\mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta]\right)
$$

where we use convexity of $u$ for the second inequality. Then, by taking max over $p \in \mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)$ we obtain $\tilde{\Gamma}^{N}(g) \leq \Gamma^{N}(g)$.

Now, for each $g, \tilde{\theta}$ and $q \in[\underline{m}, \bar{m}]$, Taylor's rule implies existence of $\omega(g$, thẽta, $q)$ :

$$
u(g-\tilde{\theta})=u(g-q)+u^{\prime}(g-\omega(g, \tilde{\theta}, q))(\tilde{\theta}-q)
$$

By the implicit function theorem, $\omega(\cdot, \theta, \cdot)$ is a differentiable, and thus continuous function.

Now, if there exists $p \in \mathbb{P}^{\boldsymbol{a}}\left(a^{N}\right)$ with $\mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta]=q$, we can take expectations with respect to $p$ in the above equation to obtain:

$$
\mathbb{E}_{p}[u(g-\tilde{\theta})]=u\left(g-\mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta]\right)+\mathbb{E}_{p}\left[u^{\prime}\left(g, \omega\left(g, \tilde{\theta}, \mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta]\right)\right)\left(\tilde{\theta}-\mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta]\right)\right]
$$

We can then use subadditivity of the max operator to obtain:

$$
\begin{array}{r}
\Gamma^{N}(g) \leq \max _{p \in \mathbb{P}^{\boldsymbol{a}}\left(a^{N}\right)} u\left(g-\mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta]\right)+\max _{p \in \mathbb{P}^{\boldsymbol{a}}\left(a^{N}\right)} \mathbb{E}\left[u^{\prime}\left(g-\omega\left(g, \tilde{\theta}, \mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta]\right)\right)\left(\tilde{\theta}-\mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta]\right)\right] \\
=\tilde{\Gamma}^{N}(g)+\max _{p \in \mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)} \mathbb{E}\left[u^{\prime}\left(g-\omega\left(g, \tilde{\theta}, \mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta]\right)\right)\left(\tilde{\theta}-\mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta]\right)\right]
\end{array}
$$

Now, fix a compact set $C$. Define $v(\tilde{\theta})=\max _{g \in C, q \in[\underline{m}, \bar{m}]} u^{\prime}(g-\omega(g, \tilde{\theta}, q))$. Which is guaranteed to be well-defined by continuity of $u^{\prime}$ and $\omega$. We then have:

$$
0 \leq \Gamma^{N}(g)-\tilde{\Gamma}^{N}(g) \leq \max _{p \in \mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)} \mathbb{E}_{p}\left[v(\tilde{\theta})\left(\tilde{\theta}-\mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta]\right)\right]
$$

Notice that neither bound depends on $g$ within this compact set. On top of that, the upper bound converges to zero. To see that, recall that all signals are informative - $\underline{\rho}>0$. That implies every $p^{N} \in \mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)$ have an almostsure convergent subsequence to a degenerate distribution. Therefore, $\tilde{\theta}-$ $\mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta] \rightarrow 0$ almost surely. That implies:

$$
\sup _{g \in C}\left|\Gamma^{N}(g)-\tilde{\Gamma}^{N}(g)\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} 0
$$

Step 1.2. $\sup _{\mathbf{g} \in \mathrm{C}}\left|\boldsymbol{\Gamma}(\mathbf{g})-\tilde{\boldsymbol{\Gamma}}^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathbf{g})\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \mathbf{0}$, as $n \rightarrow \infty$, for all compact sets $C \subset \mathbb{R}$
Recall that we can write $\tilde{\Gamma}^{N}(g)=\max \left\{u\left(g-\bar{m}^{N}\right), u\left(g-\underline{m}^{N}\right)\right\}$. Also by Theorem $1, \bar{m}^{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \bar{m}$ and $\underline{m}^{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \underline{m}$.

We use the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Let $f^{N}, g^{N}, f, g$ for $N \in \mathbb{N}$ be functions from $D \subset \mathbb{R}$ into the reals, and let $h^{N}=\max \left\{f^{N}, g^{N}\right\}$ and $h=\max \{f, g\}$. If $\sup _{x}\left|f^{N}-f\right| \rightarrow 0$ and $\sup _{x} \mid g^{N}-$ $g \mid \rightarrow 0$ then, $\sup _{x}\left|h^{N}-h\right| \rightarrow 0$.

Proof. For any fixed $\varepsilon$ there exist $N_{f}$ and $N_{g}$ such that, for all $x \in D$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left|f^{N}(x)-f(x)\right|<\varepsilon \text { if } N \geq N_{f} \\
& \left|g^{N}(x)-g(x)\right|<\varepsilon \text { if } N \geq N_{g}
\end{aligned}
$$

Take $N \geq \tilde{N}=\max \left\{N_{f}, N_{g}\right\}$. We then have:

$$
\begin{array}{r}
h(x) \leq\left(f^{N}(x)+\varepsilon\right) \mathbb{1}_{f(x) \geq g(x)}+\left(g^{N}(x)+\varepsilon\right) \mathbb{1}_{g(x) \geq f(x)} \\
\leq h^{N}(x)+\varepsilon
\end{array}
$$

where the second inequality comes from the definition of $h^{N}$. By the same logic, inverting the roles of $h$ and $h^{N}$ :

$$
\begin{array}{r}
h^{N}(x) \leq(f(x)+\varepsilon) \mathbb{1}_{f^{N}(x) \geq g^{N}(x)}+(g(x)+\varepsilon) \mathbb{1}_{g^{N}(x) \geq f^{N}(x)} \\
\leq h(x)+\varepsilon
\end{array}
$$

By joining the two inequalities above: $\left|h(x)-h^{N}(x)\right| \leq \varepsilon$ for all $N \geq \tilde{N}$. Because $x$ is arbitrary, we have our result.

In order to apply the result above, notice that $\sup _{g \in C}|u(g-x)-u(g-y)|$ is a continuous function of $x$ and, thus, converges to 0 as $x \rightarrow y$. Thus, $\sup _{g \in C}\left|u\left(g-\bar{m}^{N}\right)-u(g-\bar{m})\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} 0$ and similarly $\sup _{g \in C} \mid u\left(g-\underline{m}^{N}\right)-u(g-$ $\underline{m}) \mid \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} 0$. Therefore, applying the above lemma, defining $f^{N}(x)=u\left(x-\bar{m}^{N}\right)$ and $g^{N}(x)=u\left(x-\underline{m}^{N}\right)$ gives us our result.

Step 1.3. $\sup _{\mathbf{g} \in \mathrm{C}}\left|\Gamma(\mathbf{g})-\Gamma^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathbf{g})\right| \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \mathbf{0}$, as $n \rightarrow \infty$, for all compact sets $C \subset \mathbb{R}$. This is directly implied by the previous two steps.

Step 2. $g^{*}$ such that $u\left(g^{*}-\underline{m}\right)=u\left(g^{*}-\bar{m}\right)$ is the unique minimum of $\Gamma$.
Recall that $\Gamma(g)=\max \{u(g-\underline{m}), u(g-\bar{m})\}$. First, notice that $g^{*}$ that minimizes $\Gamma$ must be in $[\underline{m}, \bar{m}]$. Assume, for a contradiction, that $\min \Gamma(g)=$ $u\left(g^{*}-\underline{m}\right)>u\left(g^{*}-\bar{m}\right)$. By continuity of $u$, we can choose $\underline{m}<g^{\prime}<g^{*}$ such that $u\left(g^{\prime}-\underline{m}\right)>u\left(g^{\prime}-\bar{m}\right)$, that is, $\Gamma\left(g^{\prime}\right)=u\left(g^{\prime}-\underline{m}\right)$. Because $u$ is strictly convex and minimized at 0 , it must be that $u\left(g^{*}-\underline{m}\right)>u\left(g^{\prime}-\underline{m}\right)$. But then, $\Gamma\left(g^{\prime}\right)<\Gamma\left(g^{*}\right)$, which is a contradiction. A similar contradiction is found if we assume $\min \Gamma(g)=u\left(g^{*}-\bar{m}\right)<u\left(g^{*}-\underline{m}\right)$. Thus, the equality must hold.

## Step 3. The sequence $g^{N}$ is uniformly bounded almost everywhere.

For an observable realization $a^{N}$, recall that $\underline{m}^{N}=\min _{p \in \mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)} \mathbb{E}[\theta]$ and, symmetrically, $\bar{m}^{N}=\max _{p \in \mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)} \mathbb{E}[\theta]$. Assume, for a contradiction, that there is an event $M$ with probability 1 , such that $g^{N}$ is unbounded. If that's the case, up to a subsequence, we have: $g^{N}>N$. Then, by strict convexity of $u$ we have:

$$
\Gamma\left(g^{N}\right)=\max _{p \in \mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)} \mathbb{E}_{p}\left[u\left(g^{N}-\theta\right)\right] \geq \max _{p \in \mathbb{P}^{a}\left(a^{N}\right)} u\left(g^{N}-\mathbb{E}_{p}[\theta]\right) \geq u\left(g^{N}-\bar{m}^{N}\right)
$$

Now, because $\bar{m}^{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \bar{m}$, we can choose an event $M^{\prime} \subset M$, also with probability one, in which $m^{N}$. That implies, with the unboundedness of $g^{N}$ and strict convexity of $u$, that the lower bound above diverges, so $\Gamma\left(g^{N}\right)$ is unbounded. To show that $g^{N}$ cannot be optimal, it suffices to show that there is a sequence $x^{N}$ such that $\Gamma\left(x^{N}\right)$ is bounded in this event. For any real $a$, take the sequence $x^{N}=a$ for all $N$. Because $\Gamma^{N} \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \Gamma$ uniformly in any compact set, we have that, for a further event $M^{\prime \prime} \subset M^{\prime}$, with probability 1 , that for any $\varepsilon$, for sufficiently large $N$,

$$
\Gamma^{N}(a)<\Gamma(a)+\varepsilon
$$

Thus, $\Gamma^{N}(a)$ is a bounded sequence, proving that, for sufficiently large $N$ :

$$
\Gamma^{N}(a)<\Gamma^{N}\left(g^{N}\right)
$$

which is the contradiction that we were seeking.

## Proof of Corollary 1

Symmetry implies Consistency. Define

$$
\bar{\zeta}(m)=\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{m} x d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{m}^{\infty} x d F(x)}{\underline{\rho} F(m)+\bar{\rho}(1-F(m))}, \quad \underline{\zeta}(m)=\frac{\bar{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{m} x d F(x)+\underline{\rho} \int_{m}^{\infty} x d F(x)}{\bar{\rho} F(m)+\underline{\rho}(1-F(m))}
$$

Clearly, $\bar{\zeta}(\bar{m})=\bar{m}$ and $\underline{\zeta}(\underline{m})=\underline{m}$. Because $F$ is symmetric around $\theta$, for $m \in \mathbb{R}$ :
$\bar{\zeta}(2 \theta-m)=\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{2 \theta-m} x d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{2 \theta-m}^{\infty} x d F(x)}{\underline{\rho} F(2 \theta-m)+\bar{\rho}(1-F(2 \theta-m))}=2 \theta-\frac{\bar{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{m} x d F(x)+\underline{\rho} \int_{m}^{\infty} x d F(x)}{\bar{\rho} F(m)+\underline{\rho}(1-F(m))}=2 \theta-\underline{\zeta}(m)$
Then, $2 \theta-\underline{m}=2 \theta-\underline{\zeta}(\underline{m})=\bar{\zeta}(2 \theta-\underline{m})$. But because $\bar{m}$ is the unique fixed point of $\bar{\zeta}:{ }^{12} \bar{m}=2 \theta-\underline{m}$, and we are done.

Asymmetry implies non-consistency for some sets. Let $x^{*}$ be such that $u\left(x^{*}\right) \neq u\left(-x^{*}\right)$. Define $\eta=\frac{\bar{\rho}}{\underline{\rho}}$. Notice, from the proof of Proposition 1 that, that $\frac{\bar{m}-m}{2}$ is an function of $\eta$ onto the real line. Then, choose $\eta^{*}$ such that $\frac{\bar{m}-\underline{m}}{2}=x^{*}$. Finally, recall that, by observable signals, $\theta=\frac{\bar{m}+\underline{m}}{2}$. Then:

$$
u(\theta-\underline{m})=u\left(x^{*}\right) \neq u\left(-x^{*}\right)=u(\theta-\bar{m})
$$

Thus, by Theorem 2, $g^{*} \neq \theta$.

[^10]
## Proof of Proposition 1

$\bar{m}(\underline{m})$ monotonically increases(decreasing) in $\eta$ We go through the proof for $\bar{m}$, a symmetric argument holds for $\underline{m}$. Define $k_{\eta}(a)$ as
$k_{\eta}(a) \equiv \mathbb{E}[\theta](a)=\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{a} x f(x) d x+\bar{\rho} \int_{a}^{\infty} x f(x) d x}{\underline{\rho} F(a)+\bar{\rho}(1-F(a))}=\frac{\int_{-\infty}^{a} x f(x) d x+\eta \int_{a}^{\infty} x f(x) d x}{F(a)+\eta(1-F(a))}$
For convenience we can rewrite $k_{\eta}(a)$ as

$$
k_{\eta}(a)=\frac{F(a) \mathbb{E}[x \mid x<a]+\eta(1-F(a)) \mathbb{E}[x \mid x \geq a]}{F(a)+\eta(1-F(a))}
$$

We know that

$$
\bar{m}=\arg \max _{a \in \mathbb{R}} k_{\eta}(a) \quad \text { and } \quad \bar{m}=\max _{a \in \mathbb{R}} k_{\eta}(a)
$$

Then, via the envelope theorem we have

$$
\frac{d \bar{m}}{d \eta}=\frac{d k_{\eta}(\bar{m})}{d \eta}=\frac{F(\bar{m})(1-F(\bar{m}))}{(F(\bar{m})+\eta(1-F(\bar{m})))^{2}}(\mathbb{E}[x \mid x \geq \bar{m}]-\mathbb{E}[x \mid x<\bar{m}])>0
$$

Step 1. As $\eta \rightarrow+\infty(-\infty), \bar{m} \rightarrow \infty(\underline{m} \rightarrow-\infty)$. First note that

$$
\lim _{\eta \rightarrow \infty} k_{\eta}(a)=\mathbb{E}[x \mid x \geq a]>a
$$

The last inequality follows from the full support of the distribution. For any $z \in \mathbb{R}$ we want to show that $\exists \tilde{\eta}$ such that $k_{\tilde{\eta}}(\bar{m}) \geq z$. From the above limit, we know that $\exists \tilde{\eta}$ such that $k_{\tilde{\eta}}(z)>z$. Because $\bar{m}=\arg \max _{a \in \mathbb{R}} k_{\eta}(a)$ we know that $k_{\tilde{\eta}}(\bar{m}) \geq k_{\tilde{\eta}}(z)>z$.

Step 2. As $\eta \rightarrow 1, \bar{m}-\underline{m} \rightarrow 0$. When $\eta \rightarrow 1, k_{\eta}(a)$ reduces to the unconditional expected value for any $a$. Similarly, the optimization problem that determines $\underline{m}$ reduces to the unconditional expected value, completely unaffected by $a$. Thus, as $\eta \rightarrow 1$ both $\bar{m}$ and $\underline{m}$ converge to the unconditional
expectation.

## Proof of Proposition 2

Let $H \leq_{\text {FOSD }} G$ be precisions distributions, and let the true value of the state be $\theta$. Assume these distributions of precision generate signal distributions $F_{H}$ and $F_{G}$ respectively. We first prove $F_{H}$ is a mean-preserving spread of $F_{G}$ — denoted $F_{G} \leq_{\text {MPS }} F_{H}$.

Signals are more disperse under $H$. Indeed, notice that:

$$
F_{H}(x)=\int_{\rho} F_{\rho}(x) d H(\rho) \quad F_{G}(x)=\int_{\rho} F_{\rho}(x) d G(\rho),
$$

where $F_{\rho}$ is the CDF of the Normal distribution with mean $\theta$ and precision $\rho$. Now, notice

$$
\int_{-\infty}^{z} F_{\rho}(x) d x=\frac{\sqrt{\rho}}{\sqrt{2 \pi}} e^{-\frac{\rho z^{2}}{2}}+\frac{1}{2} z \cdot \operatorname{Erfc}\left(-\frac{\sqrt{\rho} z}{\sqrt{2}}\right) .
$$

Is decreasing in $\rho$. Thus:

$$
\int_{-\infty}^{z} F_{H}(x) d x=\int_{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{z} F_{\rho}(x) d x d H(\rho) \geq \int_{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{z} F_{\rho}(x) d x d G(\rho)=\int_{-\infty}^{z} F_{G}(x) d x
$$

where the change in the integration order is a consequence of Tonelli's theorem, and the inequality is justified because $\int_{-\infty}^{z} F_{\rho}(x) d x$ is decreasing in $\rho$, and $G$ first-order stochastically dominate $H$. This inequality implies $F_{H}$ second-order stochastically dominates $F_{G}$. But it is clear $F_{H}$ and $F_{G}$ have the same mean, $\theta$. So we proved $F_{H}$ is a mean-preserving spread of $F_{G}$. We now use this result to conclude the proof.

Asymptotic belief set is larger under $H$. We prove the result for the upper bound. The result holds for the lower bound by symmetry. For a signal distribution $P$, define:
$k_{P}(a)=\frac{\int_{-\infty}^{a} x d P(x) d x+\eta \int_{a}^{\infty} x d P(x) d x}{P(a)+\eta(1-P(a))}=\frac{P(a) \mathbb{E}_{P}[x \mid x \leq a]+\eta(1-P(a)) \mathbb{E}_{P}[x \mid x \geq a]}{P(a)+\eta(1-P(a))}$
We know:

$$
\bar{m}_{G}=\max _{a} k_{F_{G}}(a) \quad \bar{m}_{H}=\max _{a} k_{F_{H}}(a)
$$

First, we implement a change of variables. For each $a$, there exists a quantile $q \in[0,1]$ such that $P(a)=q$. We can then write:

$$
k_{P}(a)=\hat{k}_{P}(q) \equiv \frac{q \mathbb{E}_{P}[x \mid P(x) \leq q]+\eta(1-q) \mathbb{E}_{P}[x \mid P(x) \geq q]}{q+\eta(1-q)}
$$

Because $F_{H}$ is a mean-preserving spread of $F_{G}$,
$\mathbb{E}_{F_{H}}\left[x \mid F_{H}(x) \geq q\right] \geq \mathbb{E}_{F_{G}}\left[x \mid F_{G}(x) \geq q\right]$ and $\quad \mathbb{E}_{F_{G}}\left[x \mid F_{G}(x) \leq q\right] \geq \mathbb{E}_{F_{H}}\left[x \mid F_{G}(x) \leq q\right]$.
Moreover, because $F_{G}$ and $F_{H}$ have the same mean:

$$
\begin{array}{r}
q \mathbb{E}_{F_{H}}\left[x \mid F_{H}(x) \leq q\right]+(1-q) \mathbb{E}_{F_{H}}\left[x \mid F_{H}(x) \geq q\right]=\mathbb{E}_{F_{H}}[x]= \\
\mathbb{E}_{F_{G}}[x]=q \mathbb{E}_{F_{G}}\left[x \mid F_{G}(x) \leq q\right]+(1-q) \mathbb{E}_{F_{G}}\left[x \mid F_{G}(x) \geq q\right] .
\end{array}
$$

Because $\eta>1$, the expressions above above imply $\hat{k}_{F_{G}}(q) \leq \hat{k}_{F_{H}}(q)$. To conclude the argument, we note:

$$
\begin{array}{r}
\bar{m}_{G}=\max _{a} k_{F_{G}}(a)=\max _{q \in[0,1]} \hat{k}_{F_{G}}(q) \leq \max _{q \in[0,1]} \hat{k}_{F_{H}}(q) \\
\\
=\max _{a} k_{F_{H}}(a)=\bar{m}_{H}
\end{array}
$$

## Proof of Proposition 3

We go through the proof for $\bar{m}$, a symmetric argument holds for $\underline{m}$. From Theorem 2 we know that

$$
\bar{m}=\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}} s^{a}(x, \underline{\rho}) d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{\bar{m}}^{\infty} s^{a}(x, \bar{\rho}) d F(x)}{\underline{\rho F}(\bar{m})+\bar{\rho}(1-F(\bar{m}))}
$$

Where $s^{a}(x, \rho)$ is the inverted signal given action $x$ and conjectured precision $\rho$, and $F(x)$ is the distribution of the observables. In the observable actions case the inverted signal is simply $\mathbf{s}^{\mathbf{a}}\left(a_{i}, \hat{\rho}_{i}\right)=a_{i}+\frac{\rho_{\mu}}{\hat{\rho}_{i}}\left(a_{i}-\mu\right)$, thus the above equation becomes

$$
\begin{aligned}
\bar{m}_{a} & =\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}_{a}}\left(x+\frac{\rho_{\mu}}{\underline{\rho}}(x-\mu)\right) d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{\bar{m}_{a}}^{\infty}\left(x+\frac{\rho_{\mu}}{\bar{\rho}}(x-\mu)\right) d F(x)}{\underline{\rho} F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)+\bar{\rho}\left(1-F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)\right)} \\
& =\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}_{a}} x d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{\bar{m}_{a}}^{\infty} x d F(x)+\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \rho_{\mu}(x-\mu) d F(x)}{\underline{\rho} F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)+\bar{\rho}\left(1-F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)\right)}
\end{aligned}
$$

Recall that actions are $\mathbf{a}\left(s_{i}, \rho_{i}\right)=\frac{\rho_{\mu} \mu+\rho_{i} s_{i}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho_{i}}$, where $\rho_{i}$ is the true not conjectured precision of the agent. Thus, given $\rho_{i}$ the expected value of the observable is $\frac{\rho_{\mu} \mu+\rho_{i} \theta}{\rho_{m} u+\rho_{i}}$, since the signals normally distributed around $\theta$. Recall from the setup that

$$
F(x)=\int_{[\underline{\rho}, \bar{\rho}]} F_{\rho}\left(s^{a}(x, \rho)\right) d G(\rho)
$$

Leading to

$$
\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \rho_{\mu}(x-\mu) d F(x)=(\theta-\mu) \int \frac{\rho \rho_{\mu}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho} d G(\rho)=c
$$

## Proof of Proposition 4

Recall from Proposition 3 that the bounds of the limiting posterior set are given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\bar{m}_{a}=\frac{\rho \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}_{a}} x d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{\bar{m}_{a}}^{\infty} x d F(x)+c}{\underline{\rho} F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)+\bar{\rho}\left(1-F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)\right)}, \quad \underline{m}_{a}=\frac{\bar{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\underline{m}_{a}} x d F(x)+\underline{\rho}_{\underline{m}_{a}}^{\infty} x d F(x)+c}{\bar{\rho} F\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)+\underline{\rho}\left(1-F\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)\right)} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $c=\frac{\rho \rho_{\mu}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho}(\theta-\mu)$.
The optimal guess is $m_{a}=\frac{\bar{m}_{a}+\underline{m}_{a}}{2}$. When $\theta=\mu, c=0$ and by Corollary 1 $m_{a}=\theta=\mu$ and the observer guesses correctly. From now on, we first focus on the case where $\theta>\mu$.

Denote $\bar{G}(z)=\underline{\rho} F(z)+\bar{\rho}(1-F(z))$ and $\underline{G}(z)=\bar{\rho} F(z)+\underline{\rho}(1-F(z))$. Rearranging the first equation and using integration by parts, we get

$$
\begin{aligned}
\bar{m}_{a} \bar{G}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right) & =\underline{\rho}\left(\left.x F(x)\right|_{-\infty} ^{\bar{m}_{a}}-\int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}_{a}} F(x) d x\right)+\bar{\rho}\left(-\left.x(1-F(x))\right|_{\bar{m}_{a}} ^{\infty}+\int_{\bar{m}_{a}}^{\infty}(1-F(x)) d x\right)+c \\
& =\underline{\rho}\left(\bar{m}_{a} F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)-\int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}_{a}} F(x) d x\right)+\bar{\rho}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\left(1-F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)\right)+\int_{\bar{m}_{a}}^{\infty}(1-F(x)) d x\right)+c \\
& =\bar{m}_{a} \bar{G}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)-\left(\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}_{a}} F(x) d x-\bar{\rho} \int_{\bar{m}_{a}}^{\infty}(1-F(x)) d x\right)+c .
\end{aligned}
$$

This implies

$$
\begin{equation*}
\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{m}_{a}} F(x) d x-\bar{\rho} \int_{\bar{m}_{a}}^{\infty}(1-F(x)) d x=c . \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

A symmetric argument for $\underline{m}_{a}$ shows that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\bar{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{\underline{m}_{a}} F(x) d x-\underline{\rho} \int_{\underline{m}_{a}}^{\infty}(1-F(x)) d x=c . \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Taking the derivative with respect to the state $\theta$ on both sides of equa-
tion 5 and equation 6 , we get

$$
\frac{d \bar{m}_{a}}{d \theta}=\frac{\rho}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho}+\frac{\rho_{\mu}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho} \frac{\rho}{\bar{G}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)} \quad \frac{d \underline{m_{a}}}{d \theta}=\frac{\rho}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho}+\frac{\rho_{\mu}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho} \frac{\rho}{\underline{G}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}
$$

The derivative of the optimal guess $m_{a}=\frac{\bar{m}_{a}+\underline{m}_{a}}{2}$ with respect to $\theta$ is then:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}=\frac{\rho}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho}+\frac{\rho_{\mu}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho} \frac{\rho}{2}\left(\frac{1}{\bar{G}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}+\frac{1}{\underline{G}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}\right) \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

Recall that $H$ is normally distributed and denote its density function as $h$. Then, we can use the derivative of the optimal bounds obtained above to calculate:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{d F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}{d \theta}=\frac{\partial F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}{\partial \bar{m}_{a}} \frac{d \bar{m}_{a}}{d \theta}+\frac{\partial F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}{\partial \theta}=-\frac{\rho_{\mu}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho} \frac{\rho}{\bar{G}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)} f\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right) \\
& \frac{d F\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}{d \theta}=\frac{\partial F\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}{\partial \underline{m}_{a}} \frac{d \underline{m}_{a}}{d \theta}+\frac{\partial F\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}{\partial \theta}=-\frac{\rho_{\mu}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho} \frac{\rho}{\underline{G}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)} f\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

It then follows that

$$
\begin{aligned}
\frac{d^{2} m_{a}}{d \theta^{2}} & =\frac{\bar{\rho}-\underline{\rho}}{2}\left(\frac{\rho \rho_{\mu}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho}\right)^{2}\left(\frac{f\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}{\bar{G}^{3}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}-\frac{f\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}{\underline{G}^{3}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}\right) \\
& =\frac{\bar{\rho}-\underline{\rho}}{2}\left(\frac{\rho \rho_{\mu}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho}\right)^{2}\left(\left(\frac{f\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}{\overline{\bar{G}}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}-\frac{f\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}{\underline{G}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}\right) \frac{1}{\underline{G}^{2}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}+\frac{f\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}{\bar{G}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}\left(\frac{1}{\bar{G}^{2}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}-\frac{1}{\underline{G}^{2}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}\right)\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Lemma 6. $\left(\frac{1}{\bar{G}^{2}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}-\frac{1}{\underline{G}^{2}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}\right)>0$ whenever $\theta>\mu$
Proof. The statement is equivalent to $\underline{G}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)>\bar{G}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)$, which is also equivalent to $F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)+F\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)>1$. Since $H$ is symmetric around $\frac{\rho \theta+\rho_{\mu} \mu}{\rho+\rho_{\mu}}$, the latter is
true if and only if $m_{a}>\frac{\rho \theta+\rho_{\mu} \mu}{\rho+\rho_{\mu}}$. We show that this is the case. Define
$\bar{\zeta}(z, u)=\frac{\underline{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{z} x d F(x)+\bar{\rho} \int_{z}^{\infty} x d F(x)+u}{\underline{\rho} F(z)+\bar{\rho}(1-F(z))}, \underline{\zeta}(z, u)=\frac{\bar{\rho} \int_{-\infty}^{z} x d F(x)+\underline{\rho} \int_{z}^{\infty} x d F(x)+u}{\bar{\rho} F(z)+\underline{\rho}(1-F(z))}$

We know $\bar{m}_{a}=\bar{\zeta}\left(\bar{m}_{a}, c\right)$, and it was previously proved that $\bar{m}_{a}$ maximizes $\bar{\zeta}\left(\bar{m}_{a}, c\right)$. By the envelope theorem we have:

$$
\frac{d \bar{\zeta}\left(\bar{m}_{a}, c\right)}{d u}=\frac{\partial \bar{\zeta}\left(\bar{m}_{a}, c\right)}{\partial u}=\frac{1}{\underline{\rho F}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)+\bar{\rho}\left(1-F\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)\right)}>0
$$

A similar argument implies that $\frac{\zeta\left(\frac{m_{a}}{d} u\right)}{d u}>0$, for all $u \in \mathbb{R}$. Finally, by an equivalent argument to the proof of Corollary 1, we have $\frac{\bar{\zeta}\left(\bar{m}_{a}, 0\right)+\underline{\zeta}\left(\underline{\underline{m}}_{a}, 0\right)}{2}=$ $\int x d H=\frac{\rho \theta+\rho_{\mu} \mu}{\rho+\rho_{m} u}$. Then, if $\theta>\mu$ - which implies $c>0$ :

$$
m_{a}=\frac{\bar{m}_{a}+\underline{m}_{a}}{2}=\frac{\bar{\zeta}\left(\bar{m}_{a}, c\right)+\underline{\zeta}\left(\underline{m_{n}}, c\right)}{2}>\frac{\bar{\zeta}\left(\bar{m}_{a}, 0\right)+\underline{\zeta}\left(\underline{m}_{a}, 0\right)}{2}
$$

This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Therefore,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(\frac{f\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}{\overline{\bar{G}}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}-\frac{f\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}{\underline{G}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}\right) \geq 0 \Longrightarrow \frac{d^{2} m_{a}}{d \theta^{2}}>0 . \tag{9}
\end{equation*}
$$

We next consider the partial derivative of the optimal guess with respect to $\rho$. We start with an alternative implicit function of $\bar{m}_{a}$ and $\underline{m}_{a}$. Notice that if $f$ as the density function of a normal distribution with mean $\tilde{\mu}$ and variance $\tilde{\sigma}^{2}$, then $\frac{\partial f(x)}{\partial x}=-\frac{x-\tilde{\mu}}{\tilde{\sigma}^{2}} f(x)$. This implies $x f(x)=\tilde{\mu} f(x)-\tilde{\sigma}^{2} \frac{\partial f(x)}{\partial x}$.

Plugging this into the initial implicit functions 4, we get

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \bar{m}_{a}=\frac{\rho_{\mu} \mu+\rho \theta}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho}+\frac{c}{\overline{\bar{G}}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}+(\bar{\rho}-\underline{\rho}) \frac{\rho}{\left(\rho_{\mu}+\rho\right)^{2}} \frac{f\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}{\bar{G}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}, \\
& \underline{m}_{a}=\frac{\rho_{\mu} \mu+\rho \theta}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho}+\frac{c}{\underline{G}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}-(\bar{\rho}-\underline{\rho}) \frac{\rho}{\left(\rho_{\mu}+\rho\right)^{2}} \frac{f\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}{\underline{G}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)} .
\end{aligned}
$$

By definition of $m_{a}$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
m_{a}=\theta+(\theta-\mu)\left(\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}-1\right)+\frac{(\bar{\rho}-\underline{\rho}) \rho}{2\left(\rho_{\mu}+\rho\right)^{2}}\left(\frac{f\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}{\bar{G}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}-\frac{f\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}{\underline{G}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}\right) . \tag{10}
\end{equation*}
$$

Based on the implicit function theorem, we can calculate the following derivative:

$$
\frac{d m_{a}}{d \rho}=\frac{\rho_{\mu}\left(m_{a}-\mu\right)+\rho\left(\theta-m_{a}\right)}{2 \rho^{2}+2 \rho_{\mu} \rho}+\frac{c}{2} \frac{\rho_{\mu}+\left(\rho_{\mu}+\rho\right) \rho}{\left(\rho_{\mu}+\rho\right) \rho}\left(\frac{1}{\bar{G}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}+\frac{1}{\underline{G}\left(\underline{m_{a}}\right)}\right) .
$$

As $\theta>\mu$, it is easy to show that $m_{a}>\mu$ and $c>0$. This leads to the following result.

$$
\begin{equation*}
\theta>\mu \quad \text { and } \quad m_{a} \leq \theta \quad \Longrightarrow \quad \frac{d m_{a}}{d \rho}>0 \tag{11}
\end{equation*}
$$

Note that the last term of $\frac{d m_{a}}{d \rho},\left(\frac{1}{\bar{G}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}+\frac{1}{\underline{G}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}\right)$ can be rewritten as $\left(\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}-\frac{\rho}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho}\right) \frac{\rho_{\mu}+\rho}{\rho_{\mu}} \frac{2}{\rho}$. Let $\kappa_{1}=\frac{1}{2 \rho^{2}+2 \rho_{\mu} \rho}$ and $\kappa_{2}=\frac{\rho_{\mu}+\left(\rho_{\mu}+\rho\right) \rho}{\rho_{\mu} \rho^{2}}$, then:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{d^{2} m_{a}}{d \rho d \theta}=\rho_{\mu} \kappa_{1} \frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}-\rho \kappa_{1}\left(\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}-1\right)+\frac{\rho \rho_{\mu}}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho} \kappa_{2}\left(\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}-\frac{\rho}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho}\right)+c \kappa_{2} \frac{d^{2} m_{a}}{d \theta^{2}} \tag{12}
\end{equation*}
$$

We know that $\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}>\frac{\rho}{\rho_{\mu}+\rho}>0$ and when $\theta=\mu, \frac{d^{2} m_{a}}{d \theta^{2}}=0$. This leads to the
following result:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\theta=\mu \quad \text { and } \quad \frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta} \leq 1 \quad \Longrightarrow \quad \frac{d^{2} m_{a}}{d \rho d \theta}>0 \tag{13}
\end{equation*}
$$

To make it clear that the optimal guess depends on $\theta$ and $\rho$, we sometimes denote $\underline{m}_{a}, \bar{m}_{a}$ and $m_{a}$ as $\underline{m}_{a}(\rho, \theta), \bar{m}_{a}(\rho, \theta)$ and $m_{a}(\rho, \theta)$. Notice that $\tilde{\rho}$ is determined by forcing $\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}$ to approach 1 when $\theta$ goes to infinity, while at $\tilde{\rho}$ we have $\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}(\tilde{\rho}, \mu)=1$.

The rest of the proof will be divided by the following lemmas. We will fix $\mu$ and consider the case with $\theta \geq \mu$.

Lemma 7. For any given $\rho$, if $m_{a}(\rho, \hat{\theta})>\hat{\theta}$ and $\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}(\rho, \hat{\theta})>1$, then $m_{a}(\rho, \theta)>\theta$ for all $\theta>\hat{\theta}$.

Proof. Fix $\rho$. Assume that there exists $\hat{\theta}, m_{a}(\rho, \hat{\theta})>\hat{\theta}$ and $\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}(\rho, \hat{\theta})>1$. Suppose by contradiction that there exists some $\bar{\theta}>\hat{\theta}$ such that $m_{a}(\rho, \bar{\theta})=$ $\bar{\theta}$. By continuity of $\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}$, there exists $\theta^{\prime}<\theta^{\prime \prime} \in(\hat{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ where $\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}\left(\rho, \theta^{\prime}\right)=1$ and $\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}\left(\rho, \theta^{\prime \prime}\right)<1$. By continuity of $m_{a}, m_{a}\left(\rho, \theta^{\prime}\right)>\theta^{\prime}$.

At $\theta^{\prime}$, equation (10) implies $\left(\frac{f\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}{\overline{\bar{G}}\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}-\frac{f\left(m_{a}\right)}{\underline{G}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}\right)>0$, which guarantees $\frac{d^{2} m_{a}}{d \theta^{2}}\left(\rho, \theta^{\prime}\right)>$ 0 . This implies that for a neighborhood to the right of $\theta^{\prime}, \frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}>1$. Notice that this holds for any $\theta \in[\hat{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ with $\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}(\rho, \theta)=1$. Thus $\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}(\rho, \theta) \geq 1$ for all $\theta \in[\hat{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$, which contradicts the assumption that $m_{a}(\rho, \bar{\theta})=\bar{\theta}$. As a result, we know $m_{a}(\rho, \theta)>\theta$ for $\theta>\hat{\theta}$. This concludes the proof of the lemma.

Lemma 8. For any given $\rho$, if there exists $\theta^{*}>\mu$ such that $m_{a}\left(\rho, \theta^{*}\right)=\theta^{*}$ and $m_{a}(\rho, \theta)<\theta$ for all $\mu<\theta<\theta^{*}$, then $m_{a}(\rho, \theta)>\theta$ for $\theta>\theta^{*}$.

Proof. Suppose there exists $\theta^{*}>\mu$ such that $m_{a}\left(\rho, \theta^{*}\right)=\theta^{*}$ and $m_{a}(\rho, \theta)<$ $\theta$ for $\mu<\theta<\theta^{*}$. This implies $\frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}\left(\rho, \theta^{*}\right) \geq 1$. Again by equation (10), we know $\left(\frac{f\left(\bar{m}_{a}\right)}{\bar{G}(\bar{m})}-\frac{f\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}{\underline{G}\left(\underline{m}_{a}\right)}\right)>0$, which leads to $\frac{d^{2} m_{a}}{d \theta^{2}}\left(\rho, \theta^{*}\right)>0$ by (9). Then for any $\theta$ in a small neighborhood to the right of $\theta^{*}, \frac{d m_{a}}{d \theta}(\rho, \theta)>1$ and $m_{a}(\rho, \theta)>\theta$. By Lemma 7. This concludes the proof of the lemma and the proposition.

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[^0]:    *We thank Roland Benabou, Simon Board, Sylvain Chassang, Alessandro Lizzeri, Pietro Ortoleva, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Can Urgun, and Leeat Yariv for very helpful suggestions and feedback. We also thank audiences at Princeton University, BEAT Conference (Tsinghua University), and The 33rd Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, for their helpful comments and discussions. An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title "Information Aggregation under Ambiguity."
    ${ }^{\dagger}$ Department of Economics, Duke University, Durham, NC - pellumb.reshidi@duke.edu
    $\ddagger$ Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ joaothereze@princeton.edu
    §Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI muzhang@umich.edu

[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ See Section 6 for a detailed discussion of these extensions.

[^2]:    ${ }^{2}$ Al-Najjar (2009) show that individuals who use frequentist models might compensate for the scarcity of data by limiting inference to a statistically simple family of events, which leads to statistically ambiguous beliefs. In their setting, such ambiguity vanishes in standard continuous outcome spaces as data increases without bounds.

[^3]:    ${ }^{3}$ There are also recent papers on misspecified social learning such as Bohren (2016), Bohren and Hauser (2019), Bohren and Hauser (2021), Frick et al. (2020a) and Frick et al.

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ Under this assumption, for each conjectured precision, the decision maker updates as if she were certain the conjecture is correct. Alternatively, we could allow the decision maker to update her beliefs given a conjectured non-degenerate distribution about the precision of each signal. Under such conjectures our qualitative results still go through; however, expressions become cumbersome.

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ In a previous version of the paper, we studied the finite N case, which we omit for brevity.

[^6]:    ${ }^{7}$ This parallels the argument that the average cost curve is minimized when it intersects the marginal cost curve.

[^7]:    ${ }^{8}$ We could also consider the comparison with a Bayesian agent who does not know the precision of each information source but rather entertains a distribution over those precisions. The comparison remains the same as long as their statistical model is identified.

[^8]:    ${ }^{9}$ With observable signals, this result holds true even for misspecified Bayesian agents who wrongly perceive the precision of the signals. As the amount of information grows without bounds, their estimates converge to the same value.

[^9]:    ${ }^{10}$ That is, the true signals are drawn i.i.d., with probability $\alpha$ from Group 1 and $1-\alpha$ from Group 2. Given a sequence of realized signals, the decision maker considers any sequence in $\{\bar{\rho}, \underline{\rho}\}^{\infty}$ with a fraction $\alpha$ taking the value $\bar{\rho}$ to be possible.
    ${ }^{11}$ Note that if $\alpha=1$ or 0 , that is, if the decision maker knows that all of her information sources are precise or imprecise, asymptotic learning is successful, and the decision maker

[^10]:    ${ }^{12}$ See the Proof of Theorem 1

