

Pëllumb Reshidi

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Placement Director: Gianluca Violante
Graduate Administrator: Laura Hedden

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EDUCATION

Princeton University Ph.D. Candidate in Economics	2015–present
Princeton University M.A. in Economics	2015–2017
Central European University M.A. in Economics (<i>with highest honors</i>)	2013–2015
University of Prishtina B.A. Faculty of Economics (<i>with highest honors</i>)	2009–2012

RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS

Primary: Microeconomic Theory, Experimental Economics
Secondary: Behavioral Economics, Industrial Organization

REFERENCES

Leeat Yariv
Princeton University
(609) 258-4021
lyariv@princeton.edu

Roland J. M. Bénabou
Princeton University
(609) 258-3672
rbenabou@princeton.edu

Alessandro Lizzeri
Princeton University
(917) 756-0238
lizzeri@princeton.edu

JOB MARKET PROJECT

“Information Sequencing with Naive Social Learning”

Does the order and timing of information arrival affect beliefs formed within a group? We address this question by extending the DeGroot social learning model to allow for sequential information arrival. We find that the final beliefs can be altered by varying only the sequencing of information arrival, keeping the information content unchanged. We identify the optimal and pessimal information release sequences that yield the highest and lowest attainable consensus, respectively. In doing so, we bound the variation in final beliefs that can be attributed to the variation in the sequencing of information. We show that groups in which all members are equally influential are those most susceptible to information sequencing. Finally, with regard to information aggregation, as the number of group members grows, the sequential arrival of information compromises the group’s beliefs: in all but particular cases, beliefs converge away from the truth.

“An Experiment on Social Learning with Information Sequencing”

We test whether the order and timing of information arrival affect beliefs formed within a group. In a lab experiment, participants estimate a parameter of interest using a common and a private signal, as well as past guesses of group members. By varying the sequencing of information arrival, we find that the order and timing of information affect the groups’ beliefs, even when the information content is unchanged. We estimate a Hybrid Model that nests the Bayesian and the sequential DeGroot model while allowing for intermediate levels of sophistication. The Bayesian benchmark does a poor job predicting participants’ belief dynamics. In contrast, a version of the sequential DeGroot model that allows for flexible weights on others’ previous actions explains participants’ behavior well. Finally, participants place excessively high and fairly constant weights on their own private signals, regardless of the signal’s arrival time.

WORKING PAPERS

“Information Aggregation under Ambiguity”

With Joao Thereze and Mu Zhang

We study information aggregation when an observer is ambiguous about the precisions of her information sources. The observer estimates a payoff relevant state by minimizing quadratic loss according to MaxMin Expected Utility, and updates her beliefs prior by prior, which induces ambiguity regarding the state. We show that this ambiguity does not vanish even if the number of information sources grows to infinity, and characterize the asymptotic set of posteriors the observer entertains. When the information sources are unbiased signals, the observer learns the state correctly. In contrast, when the observer has access only to other agent’s guesses, her estimate converges away from the truth with probability one.

“Individual and Collective Information Acquisition: An Experimental Study”

With Alessandro Lizzeri, Leeat Yariv, Jimmy Chan, and Wing Suen

Many committees—juries, political task forces, etc.—spend time gathering costly information before reaching a decision. We report results from lab experiments focused on such information–collection processes. We consider decisions governed by individuals and groups and compare how voting rules affect outcomes. We also contrast *static* information collection, as in classical hypothesis testing, with *dynamic* collection, as in sequential hypothesis testing. Generally, outcomes approximate the theoretical benchmark and sequential information collection is welfare enhancing relative to static collection. Nonetheless, several important departures emerge. Static information collection is excessive, and sequential information collection is non-stationary, producing declining decision accuracies over time. Furthermore, groups using majority rule yield especially hasty and inaccurate decisions.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“The Economics of Information Intermediaries”

With Can Urgan

“Learning and Spillovers under Imperfect Competition”

OTHER RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Lab Manager: Princeton Experimental Laboratory for the Social Sciences
Princeton University

September 2017–present
New Jersey, United States

Research Assistant for Prof. Roland Benabou
Princeton University

June 2016–September 2016
New Jersey, United States

Research Assistant for Prof. Peter Kondor
Central European University

June 2014–August 2014
Budapest, Hungary

TEACHING AND ADVISING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant: Microeconomic Analysis (Graduate)
Princeton University – Princeton School of Public and International Affairs
Student Evaluation (4.9/5)

September 2018–January 2019
New Jersey, United States

Teaching Assistant: Microeconomic Analysis (Graduate)
Princeton University – Princeton School of Public and International Affairs
Student Evaluation (4.9/5)

September 2017–January 2018
New Jersey, United States

Junior Independent Work Advising (Undergraduate)
Princeton University – Department of Economics

September 2017–June 2018
New Jersey, United States

REFEREEING

American Economic Review; AEJ: Microeconomics; Econometrica; Games and Economic Behavior

HONORS, AWARDS AND GRANTS

Princeton University - Charlotte Elizabeth Procter - University Wide Honorific Fellowship	2020-2021
Princeton University - Goldfeld Summer Fellowship	Summer-2019
Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs - Graduate Teaching Award	2018-2019
Princeton University - Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Grant	2016-2020
Princeton University - The J. Edward Lundy *40 Fellowship for Economics	2016-2017
Princeton University - Princeton University Graduate Fellowship	2015-2021
Central European University - Peter Hangartner Fellowship	2014-2015
Central European University - Alumni Scholarship	2013-2014
Central European University - Department Fellowship	2013-2014
University of Prishtina - Annual Scholarship	2010-2012

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

NBER Junior Researcher Series (<i>scheduled</i>)	2021
ESA's Job-Market Candidates Seminar Series	2020
Student Workshop in Experimental Economics Techniques - Princeton	2020
Economic Science Association Global Online Around-the-Clock Meetings	2020
Student Workshop in Experimental Economics Techniques - Wharton	2019
The 30th International Conference on Game Theory - Stony Brook Center for Game Theory	2019
The 29th Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association	2019

WORKSHOPS

Workshop on Privacy - Princeton University	2020
2nd Annual East Coast Behavioral/Experimental Workshop - Princeton University	2019
Graduate Workshop in Experimental Economics - Chapman University	2019
briq Summer School in Behavioral Economics	2016

MISCELLANEOUS

Computer Skills

Python, Matlab, Stata, Mathematica